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ABSTRACT
We focus on privacy in public. The notion dates back over a
century, at least to the work of the German sociologist, Georg
Simmel. Simmel observed that people voluntarily limit their
knowledge of each other as they interact in a wide variety of
social and commercial roles, thereby making certain
information private relative to the interaction even if it is
otherwise publicly available. Current governmental surveillance
in the US (and elsewhere) reduces privacy in public. But to
what extent?
The question matters because adequate self-realization
requires adequate privacy in public. That in turn depends on
informational norms, social norms that govern the collection,
use, and distribution of information. Adherence to such norms
is constitutive of a variety of relationships in which parties
coordinate their use of information. Examples include
student/teacher and journalist/confidential source. Current
surveillance undermines privacy in public by undermining
norm-enabled coordination. The 1950 to 1990 East German
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Stasi illustrates the threat to self-realization. The hidden, but
for every citizen tangible omni-presence of the Stasi, damaged
the very basic conditions for individual and societal creativity
and development: Sense of ones self, Trust, Spontaneity.1 The
United States is not East Germany, but it is on the road that
leads there. And that raises the question of how far down that
road it has traveled.
To support the on the road claim and answer the how
far question, we turn to game-theoretic studies of the Assurance
Game (more popularly known as the Stag Hunt). We combine
our analysis of that game with a characterization of current
governmental surveillance in terms of five concepts: knowledge,
use, merely knowing, complicity, and uncertainty. All five
combine to undermine norm-enabled coordination. The
Assurance Game shows how useboth legitimate and not
legitimateleads to discoordination. Enough discoordination
would lead to a Stasi-like world. But will that happen? A
comparison with the Stasi shows cause for concern. The United
States possesses a degree of knowledge about its citizens that the
Stasi could only dream of. Moreoverperhapsit arguably
surpasses the Stasi in complicity, even though Stasi informants
spied on friends, workmates, neighbours and family members.
Husbands spied on wives.2 The Stasi only clearly exceeded the
United States in repressive use. While it is difficult to predict
the future of surveillance, we conclude with three probable
scenarios. In only one is there an adequate degree of privacy in
public.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2007, the security expert Bruce Schneier noted,
History will record what we, here in the early decades of the
information age, did to foster freedom, liberty, and democracy. Did
we build information technologies that protected peoples freedoms
even during times when society tried to subvert them? Or did we
build technologies that could easily be modified to watch and
control?3
Is the answer already obvious? A large literature now details
the watch and control practices of businesses and
governments.4 Add Edward Snowdens revelations,5 and it is
3. Bruce Schneier, Risks of Data Reuse, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (June
28, 2007, 8:34 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/06
/risks_of_data_r.html.
4. See, e.g., JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION: A QUEST FOR PRIVACY,
SECURITY, AND FREEDOM IN A WORLD OF RELENTLESS SURVEILLANCE (2014);
JAMES BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY: THE ULTRA-SECRET NSA FROM 9/11
TO THE EAVESDROPPING ON AMERICA (2008); HEIDI BOGHOSIAN, SPYING ON
DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE, CORPORATE POWER, AND PUBLIC
RESISTANCE (2013); SIMON CHESTERMAN, ONE NATION UNDER
SURVEILLANCE: A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT TO DEFEND FREEDOM WITHOUT
SACRIFICING LIBERTY (2011); RONALD J. DEIBERT, BLACK CODE: INSIDE THE
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hard to avoid Schneiers own 2013 watch and control
conclusion:
So were done. Welcome to a world where Google knows exactly
what sort of porn you all like, and more about your interests than
your spouse does. Welcome to a world where your cell phone
company knows exactly where you are all the time. Welcome to the
end of private conversations, because increasingly your
conversations are conducted by e-mail, text, or social networking
sites. And welcome to a world where all of this, and everything else
that you do or is done on a computer, is saved, correlated, studied,
passed around from company to company without your knowledge or
consent; and where the government accesses it at will without a
warrant. Welcome to an Internet without privacy, and weve ended
up here with hardly a fight.6
Are we done? Our answer is, Not yet. An adequate degree of
privacy may still be possible. We conclude with a suggestion
about what is necessary to make that possibility a reality.
We focus exclusively on governmental surveillance.7 We
also confine our attention to informational privacy, the ability
BATTLE FOR CYBERSPACE (2013); BEATRICE EDWARDS, THE RISE OF THE
AMERICAN CORPORATE SECURITY STATE: SIX REASONS TO BE AFRAID (2014);
LUIS A. FERNANDEZ, POLICING DISSENT: SOCIAL CONTROL AND THE ANTI-
GLOBALIZATION MOVEMENT (2008); JOHN GILLIOM & TORIN MONAHAN,
SUPERVISION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY (2013);
GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND
THE U. S. SURVEILLANCE STATE (2014); HARDING, supra note 2; SUSAN
LANDAU, SURVEILLANCE OR SECURITY?: THE RISKS POSED BY NEW
WIRETAPPING TECHNOLOGIES (2010); ROBERT H. SLOAN & RICHARD WARNER,
UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS: THE CRISIS IN ONLINE PRIVACY AND SECURITY (2013)
[hereinafter SLOAN & WARNER, UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS]; THE WASH. POST,
NSA SECRETS: GOVERNMENT SPYING IN THE INTERNET AGE (2013); ATHAN G.
THEOHARIS, ABUSE OF POWER: HOW COLD WAR SURVEILLANCE AND SECRECY
POLICY SHAPED THE RESPONSE TO 9/11 (2011); Jon D. Michaels, All the
Presidents Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on
Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901 (2008); Joel R. Reidenberg, The Data
Surveillance State in the United States and Europe, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
583 (2014); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1934 (2013).
5. See e.g., GREENWALD, supra note 4; HARDING, supra note 2; THE
WASH. POST, supra note 4.
6. Bruce Schneier, The Internet Is a Surveillance State, CNN (Mar. 16,
2013, 2:04 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/16/opinion/schneier-internet-
surveillance/index.html [hereinafter The Internet Is a Surveillance State]. The
warrant issues are far more complicated than Schneier suggests. See generally
Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805 (2005).
7. Private sector surveillance raises related concerns, as we have
discussed elsewhere. See SLOAN & WARNER, UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS, supra
note 4; Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, Beyond Notice and Choice:
Privacy, Norms, and Consent, 14 SUFFOLK U. J. HIGH TECH. L. 370 (2014)
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to determine what others do with your information.8 Advances
in information processing technology reduce privacy by giving
others immense and increasing control over your information.9
This is particularly true of privacy in public.10 The notion of
privacy in public dates back over a century, at least to the work
[hereinafter Sloan & Warner, Beyond Notice]; Robert H. Sloan & Richard
Warner, Big Data and the New Privacy Tradeoff, in BIG DATA AND PRIVACY:
MAKING ENDS MEET 110 (Future of Privacy Forum & Stanford Law Sch. Ctr.
for Internet & Socy eds., 2013), http://www.futureofprivacy.org/big-data-
privacy-workshop-paper-collection; Richard Warner & Robert H. Sloan,
Behavioral Advertising: From One-Sided Chicken to Informational Norms, 15
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 49 (2012) [hereinafter Warner & Sloan, Behavioral
Advertising]; Richard Warner & Robert H. Sloan, Self, Privacy, and Power: Is
It All Over?, 17 TUL. J. TECH. INTELL. PROP. 61 (2014) [hereinafter Warner &
Sloan, Self, Privacy, and Power].
8. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); see also U.S. Dept
of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763
(1989) ([B]oth the common law and the literal understandings of privacy
encompass the individuals control of information concerning his or her
person.); JAMES B. RULE, PRIVACY IN PERIL 3 (2007) (defining privacy as the
exercise of an authentic option to withhold information on ones self); Michael
Froomkin, The Death of Privacy, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2000) (I will
use informational privacy as shorthand for the ability to control the
acquisition or release of information about oneself.).
9. See, e.g., The Center for Digital Democracy & U.S. PIRG, Comment
Letter on Preliminary FTC Staff Report on Protecting Consumer Privacy in an
Era of Rapid Change: A Proposed Framework For Businesses and
Policymakers 1, 1520 (Feb. 8, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files
/documents/public_comments/preliminary-ftc-staff-report-protecting-
consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-proposed-framework/00338-57839.pdf.
10. Helen Nissenbaums work sparked the current focus on privacy in
public. See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L.
REV. 119 (2004) [hereinafter Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual]; Helen
Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of
Privacy in Public, 17 LAW & PHIL. 559 (1998) [hereinafter Nissenbaum,
Protecting Privacy]; Helen Nissenbaum, Toward an Approach to Privacy in
Public: Challenges of Information Technology, 7 ETHICS & BEHAV. 207 (1997).
Our approach in terms of norms is indebted to her work. For other
recognitions of privacy in public, see James W. Patton, Protecting Privacy in
Public? Surveillance Technologies and the Value of Public Places, 2 ETHICS &
INFO. TECH. 181 (2000); Herman T. Tavini, Search Engines, Personal
Information and the Problem of Privacy in Public, 3 INTL REV. INFO. ETHICS
39 (2005); Nick Taylor, State Surveillance and the Right to Privacy, 1
SURVEILLANCE & SOCY 66 (2002). A 2013 report from Canadas Information
and Privacy Commissioner emphasizes the importance of privacy in public.
ANN CAVOUKIAN, SURVEILLANCE, THEN AND NOW: SECURING PRIVACY IN
PUBLIC SPACES (2013), http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/pbd-
surveillance.pdf. There is a well-established practice in sociology of regarding
privacy as existing in public through selective disclosure. See, e.g., CHRISTENA
NIPPERT-ENG, ISLANDS OF PRIVACY (2010).
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of the German sociologist Georg Simmel, who observed that
people voluntarily limit their knowledge of each other as they
interact in a wide variety of social and commercial roles.11 The
mutual restraint ensures that information remains private
relative to the interaction even if it is otherwise publicly
available.12
Current governmental surveillance reduces privacy in
public.13 But to what extent? The question matters because
adequate self-realization requires adequate privacy in public.14
That in turn depends on informational norms, social norms
that govern the collection, use, and distribution of
information.15 Current surveillance practices threaten to
undermine norm-enabled coordination and thereby to
undermine privacy in public. The 1950 to 1990 East German
Stasi illustrates the threat. The hidden, but for every citizen
tangible omni-presence of the Stasi, damaged the very basic
conditions for individual and societal creativity and
development: Sense of ones self, Trust, Spontaneity.16 The
United States is not East Germany, but it is on the road that
leads there. And that raises the question of how far it will
travel. Sections IIV support the on the road claim. Section V
explores how far the United States will go down that road.
Section I characterizes the concept of privacy in public and
argues that informational norms play a central role in the
creating of privacy in public. Section II connects the loss of
privacy in public to the loss of self-realization. Section III
presents five surveillance concepts essential to our explanation
of why governmental surveillance undermines norm-enabled
privacy in public. Section IV uses that conceptual framework to
11. Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies, 11 AM.
J. SOC. 441, 46768 (1906).
12. The connection between privacy and the self is a standard theme in
the privacy literature. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY
98 (2008) ([T]heorists have proclaimed the value of privacy to be protecting
intimacy, friendship, dignity, individuality, human relationships, autonomy,
freedom, self-development, creativity, independence, imagination,
counterculture, eccentricity, freedom of thought, democracy, reputation, and
psychological well-being.).
13. See Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy, supra note 10, at 56163.
14. See Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 26, 37 (1976) (I shall myself argue that the right to privacy is
fundamentally connected to personhood.).
15. Sloan & Warner, Beyond Notice, supra note 7, at 40714.
16. BRUCE, supra note 1.
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construct a model of how surveillance undermines privacy in
public. Section V uses that model to address the question of
how far the United States may travel down the road toward a
Stasi-like world.
I. PRIVACY IN PUBLIC
A good way to introduce privacy in public is to begin with
the question, Why isnt it a contradiction? After all, purely
private things are completely inaccessible to others, while
[p]urely public [things] are completely accessible to others.17
Distinguishing different kinds of opposites dispels the
appearance of contradiction.
Some opposites are completely mutually exclusive. Thus
Lou Manheim to Bud Fox in Wall Street: You cant be just a
little bit pregnant when you are talking bankruptcy. You cant
be just a little bit bankrupt. You are either bankrupt or not
bankrupt.18 There is no middle ground for bankrupt/not
bankrupt and pregnant/not pregnant. They are mutually
exclusive. But not all opposites are. 19 Take cheap and
expensive. Something can be a little cheap, or little expensive.
Cheap as possible and expensive as possible are opposite
ends of a sliding scale.
Private and public are also sliding scale opposites.20 The
scales endpoints of the scale are completely inaccessible to
others and completely accessible to others.21 To characterize
privacy in public, we distinguish three regions on the scale:
enclosure, obscurity, and voluntary restraint. The latter two
comprise privacy in public. Both are ways in which people can
17. NIPPERT-ENG, supra note 10, at 4.
18. Idiomsfanatic, You Cant Be Just a Little Bit Pregnant, URBAN
DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term
=you+can%27t+be+just+a+little+bit+pregnant (last visited Feb. 28, 2015); see
also Wall Street (1987 film), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/w
/index.php?title=Wall_Street_(1987_film)&oldid=649166214 (last visited Sept.
12, 2015).
19. See generally Aristotle on Non-contradiction, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL. (Feb. 22, 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-
noncontradiction/ (An object can be potentially F and potentially not F, but it
cannot be actually F and actually not F at the same time.).
20. NIPPERT-ENG, supra note 10, at 4 (noting that [p]rivacy and
publicity . . . are each defined with and by each other along [a] conceptual
sliding scale).
21. Id.
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ensure that others have no or limited access to information
through their own efforts without relying on legal regulation.
We do not mean to suggest that legal regulation is irrelevant to
privacy in public. The point is simply that focusing on what
people can do on their own provides a useful characterization of
privacy in public.
A. ENCLOSURE
To enclose information is to surround it with a barrier that
hinders others access to it.22 Houses and safes are examples.
So are sealed letterseven though a bit of glue or tape is not
much of a barrier. The seal is effective because opening
anothers mail violates social norms.23 Houses and safes are
similar. Both would offer less protection if it were socially
acceptable to pick locks. The law of course also plays a role; it
is, for example, illegal to open anothers undelivered mail.24 In
general, the protection an enclosure provides is a function of
the type of physical barrier, the relevant norms, and laws.25 It
would be interesting to explore the connections between norms
laws and privacy by enclosure, but our concern is primarily
with the two forms of privacy in public, obscurity and voluntary
restraint.
B. OBSCURITY
Cities are a classic example of privacy by obscurity. As E.
B. White famously observes, cities bestow the gift of loneliness
22. The conception of privacy as enclosure is akin to Daniel Soloves
secrecy paradigm. According to that paradigm, privacy is invaded by
uncovering ones hidden world, by surveillance, and by the disclosure of
concealed information. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON:
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 8 (2004). The secrecy
paradigm, however, has a much broader reach than privacy as enclosure.
Enclosing information is only one way to kept it secret. As we explain below,
obscurity and voluntary restraint can also ensure secrecy; thus, Soloves
secrecy conception spans the distinctions we are drawing.
23. See ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLINS WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND
CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 2426, 5256 (2000);
NIPPERT-ENG, supra note 10, at 7071.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1702 (2012) (criminalizing the obstruction of
correspondence).
25. See generally BRUCE SCHNEIER, LIARS AND OUTLIERS: ENABLING THE
TRUST THAT SOCIETY NEEDS TO THRIVE (2012) (examining the role of trust
and norms in ensuring security and privacy).
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and the gift of privacy.26 That gift also impressed the great
nineteenth-century sociologist of urban life, Georg Simmel. He
emphasized the independence of the individual . . . in the
dense crowds of the metropolis,27 and he noted that under
certain circumstances, one never feels as lonely and as deserted
as in this metropolitan crush of persons.28 The crush of
persons made it possible for Edward Snowden to elude the
United States in Hong Kong.29 The citys gift of privacy
allowed Snowden to elude the United States government while
out in public.30 Shifting between several homes . . . [h]e was
lost in a densely packed metropolis of seven million people.31
As the city examples suggest, we will treat privacy by obscurity
and privacy by enclosure as mutually exclusive. Simplicity is
the reason. The borderline cases are interesting,32 but there is
no need to examine them here.
We focus on the fact that, as Woodrow Hartzog and
Frederic Stutzman note in their seminal article on obscurity,
the concept of obscurity has languished in legal privacy
doctrine.33 The problem is that obscurity is generally equated
with hidden, and then dismissed as an unhelpful concept in
privacy disputes.34 Or, obscurity is conflated with other
concepts such as confidentiality or the notion of public
information and consequently overlooked as a distinct concept
that could aid in the analysis of privacy disputes.35 The
neglected and distorted state of obscurity in privacy doctrine is
a significant problem because the concept of obscurity is too
26. E.B. WHITE, HERE IS NEW YORK 19 (The Little Bookroom 1999)
(1949).
27. Georg Simmel, The Metropolis and Mental Life, in GEORG SIMMEL ON
INDIVIDUALITY AND SOCIAL FORMS 324, 334 (Donald N. Levine ed., Edward
Shills trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1971) (1903).
28. Id.
29. HARDING, supra note 2.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 21516.
32. Snowden in Hong Kong may be a borderline caseenclosure no doubt
played some role in obscuring his location. See id.
33. Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online
Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV 1, 3 (2013). Our discussion of obscurity has
benefitted greatly from their insightful examination of obscurity.
34. Id. at 1718.
35. Id. at 4041.
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central to the expectations of Internet users for courts and
lawmakers to ignore.36
One good way to show that obscurity is a distinct concept is
to define it. Snowdens Hong Kong saga suggests an initial
definition: information is obscure when it is not enclosed but
still difficult to obtain.37 Refining this proposal leads to an
adequate characterization of privacy by obscurity.
The first refinement is to change difficult to difficult for a
particular person in particular circumstances. To see the need,
imagine you are attending a concert. You know a friend is too,
but you cannot find her during the intermission. She is not
enclosed. She is publicly observable, and is indeed being
observed by others. Your problem is that her location is
obscure. The crowd makes it difficult to find her. Difficult for
you, that isnot for the people standing next to her. The
current definition ignores the fact that what is difficult for one
person may not be so for another. The solution is easy:
information is obscure for a person when it is not enclosed but
is still difficult for that person to obtain.38
Relativizing to persons is necessary but not enough. The
reason: people differ in what they find difficult. Consider the
Wheres Waldo? books. The task is to find Waldo in a two page-
spread packed with characters that look more or less like
him.39 Waldo is the only one in a red-and-white-striped shirt,
bobble hat, and glasses, but the clutter of others makes him
hard to see.40 How hard depends on who is looking. The task
can be daunting for an eight-year-old but easy for an adult, for
whom finding Waldo just takes a little time and attention.
Compare finding your friend at the concert. Time and attention
36. Id. at 3.
37. Technology has decreased the amount of privacy by obscurity in recent
years. For example, today somebody carrying a powered-on smartphone with
typical settings would not be obscure to the government even among Hong
Kongs massive population. Snowden was careful not to do this. As another
example, many US local government public records that were once available
only in a myriad of scattered school district, township, county, etc. offices are
now available online. HARDING, supra note 2; see, e.g., SLOAN & WARNER,
UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS, supra note 4 at 44 (discussing data mining and
hidden information).
38. See generally Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 33, at 18.
39. See, e.g., MARTIN HANDFORD, WHERES WALDO? THE FANTASTIC
JOURNEY (1989) (providing pictures of Waldo and instructions on how to locate
him across the book).
40. Id.
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may not be enough. Some means of finding your friend are
unavailablee.g., using a tracking device like Footprints
installed on her phone.41 She did not install the app, so you
cannot use it to find her. Some means are available but
unacceptable: for example, screaming her name at the top of
your lungs, or (imagine you are an armed Secret Service agent)
firing a gun into the air and then insisting that everyone line
up for review. Some means may be available and acceptable,
but cost too much. Suppose you want to find a friend in London
with whom you have lost contact for years. Is the relevant
information obscure for you? That depends on how much time,
effort, and money you are willing to invest. You could hire a
private investigator,42 or try your hand at the detective work
yourself.43 It you are not willing to bear the cost, the
information remains obscure to you.
What is the best way to accommodate these points about
means in the definition of obscurity? We suggest changing
difficult to sufficiently difficult: information is obscure for a
person provided that it is not enclosed, and it is sufficiently
difficult for that person to obtain that information. Sufficiency
is a contextual question. What counts as sufficient depends on
available and acceptable means of obtaining the information in
the circumstances, and the cost involved in employing those
means in those circumstances (understand cost broadly to
include not just monetary costs, but time, effort, and negative
consequences). So will this do? Information is obscure for a
person provided that it is not enclosed, and it is sufficiently
difficult for that person to obtain that information.44
Not quite. Our examples are all lost-in-the-crowd cases,45
but that is not the only way to make information obscure.
Superman achieves obscurity through his disguise as Clark
Kent.46 Superman is not obscured by a crowd when he stands
41. Find My Kids: Footprints, FOOTPRINTS, http://www.footprints.net/
(last visited Sept. 12, 2015).
42. Missing Persons, HERITAGE INVESTIGATIONS,
http://privateinvestigatorchicago.com/2012/missing-persons-chicago/ (last
visited Sept. 12, 2015).
43. Using, for example, Google and sites like PeopleFinders.
PEOPLEFINDERS, http://www.peoplefinders.com/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
44. Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 33, at 4.
45. As Woodrow Hartzog pointed out to us. Id.
46. LARRY TYE, SUPERMAN: THE HIGH-FLYING HISTORY OF AMERICAS
MOST ENDURING HERO 19 (2012).
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in front of Lois Lane as Clark Kent; he is obscured by his
disguise.47 Compare disaggregated information. When it is
aggregated, it can reveal a great deal even when no one piece or
small collection is particularly revealing.48 Should we think of
the significance of the aggregated information as lost in the
crowd or as disguised? Either answer is defensible. We opt for
disguised. The idea is that the disaggregated information can
stand right in front of you with its significance disguised by its
disaggregated status. You could remove the disguise by
obtaining more information, but you may not be able to afford
the necessary time, effort, and money.
One final point remains. We have so far defined obscurity
in terms of sufficient difficulty in obtaining information.49
Obtain is ambiguous in ways we need to clarify. The Navajo
code talkers of World War II are a good example. The Navajo
code talkers took part in every assault the U.S. Marines
conducted in the Pacific from 1942 to 1945 . . . transmitting
messages by telephone and radio in their native language, a
code that the Japanese never broke.50 The lack of
understanding made the information obscure for them. They
could still record it of course. So when they recorded the
information, did they obtain it? The same question arises for
encryption, a modern analogue of Navajo code talking.51 Do
people obtain information when they possess encrypted
information they cannot decrypt? The answer is the same for
both cases. Yes, if obtaining includes possessing information in
a form you cannot make sense of it. No, if obtaining
information requires possession and understanding. It is
important to distinguish the two cases, and one good way to do
47. Id. (describing the creation and dynamic of the Clark Kent and Lois
Lane relationship, Lois who was ga-ga over super-powered Superman and
had an antipathy toward meek, mild Clark).
48. See U.S. Dept of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989).
49. As Woodrow Hartzog pointed out to us. Hartzog & Stutzman, supra
note 33.
50. Navy & Marine Corps WWII Commemorative Comm., Navajo Code
Talkers: World War II Fact Sheet, NAVAL HIST. & HERITAGE COMMAND (May
19, 2004, 10:38 AM), http://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-
topic/diversity/native-americans-in-the-navy/navajo-code-talkers-world-war-ii-
fact-sheet.html.
51. Conor Friedersdorf, How Dangerous is Encryption, ATLANTIC (July 14,
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/nsa-encryption-
ungoverned-spaces/398423/.
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that is to let obtain include possess without understanding
and use understand for the possess with understanding.
Thus our final definition of obscurity: Information is
obscure for a person provided that it is not enclosed, and it is
sufficiently difficult for that person to obtain or to understand
that information.52 Two essential points become clear against
the background of this definition. The first is that privacy by
obscurity is rapidly eroding.53 It is a casualty of the
surveillance practices we describe in the next section. Those
practices greatly reduce the difficulty of both obtaining and
understanding information.54 The second point is that, even in
full flower, privacy by obscurity would not give us all the
privacy we need. The reason is that adequate privacy requires
trusting others in ways that privacy by obscurity does not
provide. The need for trust arises from the need to interact
with others in ways that require revealing information to
them.55 Unless you can trust the others to handle that
information in acceptable ways, you lose control over it and
hence lose informational privacy. Privacy by obscurity provides
no grounds for trusting others with ones information. Only the
system of voluntary restraint does that.
52. Compare Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Obscurity: A Better Way
to Think About Your Data than Privacy, ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/01/obscurity-a-better-
way-to-think-about-your-data-than-privacy/267283/ (Obscurity is the idea
that when information is hard to obtain or understand, it is, to some degree,
safe. Safety, here, doesnt mean inaccessible. Competent and determined data
hunters armed with the right tools can always find a way to get it. Less
committed folks, however, experience great effort as a deterrent.).
53. Evan Selinger & Woodward Hartzog, Obscurity and Privacy, in THE
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 68 (Joseph Pitt &
Ashley Shew eds., forthcoming).
54. See generally The Internet Is a Surveillance State, supra note 6
(claiming that everything we do or say on a computer is saved and can be
accessed without warrant); DEIBERT, supra note 4 at 63 (explaining how
private sector surveillance systems have access to all of the data about us on
social media). Contra Ashlee Vance & Brad Stone, Palantir, the War on
Terrors Secret Weapon, BUSINESSWEEK, (Nov. 22, 2011),
http://www.businessweek.com/printer/articles/5771-palantir-the-war-on-
terrors-secret-weapon (explaining how the large volume of information
obtained by surveillance makes acquiring pertinent information exceedingly
unlikely).
55. SCHNEIER, supra note 25 (examining the role of trust as necessary in
a functioning society).
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Our definition of obscurity is narrower than the one
Hartzog and Stutzman offer. The difference is clear when they
appeal to the sociologist Erving Goffmans The Presentation of
Self in Everyday Life56 to point out that individuals both
consciously and subconsciously attempt to produce obscurity to
protect their persons (defensively) or advance their goals
(offensively).57 We agree that people attempt to produce
privacy, but we distinguish two situations in which they do so,
only one of which we categorize producing obscurity. In the
first, a person succeeds in making it sufficiently difficult for
others to obtain or understand information so that the
information is obscure in the sense of our definition. The
second situation is the one that impressed Simmel: people often
voluntarily restrict the information they collect, use, and
distribute.58 They thereby ensure that certain information is
private for purposes of the transaction even if it is public for
other purposes. The information need not be difficult to
obtainat least not so difficult that it qualifies as obscure.
Peoples voluntary restraint, nonetheless, keeps the
information private for certain purposes even if it is public for
others. We classify these cases separately as cases of voluntary
restraint, not obscurity.59
Voluntary restraint promises privacy in public even in a
world in which people store and exchange massive amounts of
information by placing it in the hands of third parties
DropBox, social media sites, webmail systems, Google search
histories, and the like. The information lacks obscurity since a
variety of third parties typically have ready access to it and
understand it.60
56. ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE
(1959).
57. Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 33, at 8 (emphasis added).
58. See Simmel, supra note 11.
59. Our disagreement with Hartzog and Stutzman may be more
terminological than substantive. Like us, they assign norms a central role.
They note that our proposed definition and framework for online obscurity is
based on Nissenbaums [norm-based] theory of contextual integrity. Hartzog
& Stutzman, supra note 33, at 19.
60. Getting to Know You: Everything People Do Online Is Avidly Followed
by Advertisers and Third-Party Trackers, ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 2014, at 5
(describing the thousands of third-party tracking firms that aggregate user
data into detailed profiles that often reach levels of specificity beyond what
advertisers can use). Sometimes advertisers do not use information they have
because they do not want to look as though they are spying on customers. We
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C. VOLUNTARY RESTRAINT
Teachers and students in large universities are a good
example. Teachers typically reveal little, if anything at all,
about their personal lives to students, and they typically
refrain from inquiring into students personal lives. Students
likewise limit what they reveal and what they ask. There are
many exceptions (the Ph.D. student/dissertation supervisor
relationship is sometimes one, for example),61 but we focus on
the general pattern. Limiting knowledge serves two important
goals. The first is evaluating students only on the basis of
relevant academic work. Limiting knowledge ensures that
students appear to teachers primarily in the light of their
relevant academic achievements, not in light of extracurricular
aspects of their personalities, past academic records, honors
conferred or punishments endured. The second goal is allowing
teachers to model an intellectual or professional style that
students can adopt and adapt in part because it is not tightly
tied to a personal history.62
Similar remarks hold for a wide variety of interactions.
Waiters do not try to find out whether you are married to your
dinner partner, nor, if they know, announce that your partner
is not your spouse. Your pharmacist does not ask if you are
happy in your marriage when you pick up your Alprazolam
can do more technologically than were permitted to culturally, says Tony
Weisman of DigitasLBi, a digital-advertising firm. Id.
61. Exceptions to informational norms are routine. See NIPPERT-ENG,
supra note 10, at 10809 ([C]onceptual guidelines about what is private or
public are only that. It is our ability to categorically stretch, contract, and
otherwise elaborate or undermine these guidelines that creates a range of
possible private-public classifications for every item, in every situation, across
individuals. Cross-cultural differences and historical changes in social
expectations regarding both of these categorical contents further complicate
the story, of course. Indeed, participants explanations of their piling decisions
reveal quite a bit about the consistencies underlying individuals
conceptualizations of private and public. The privateness or publicness of an
object also manifested in how people described handling it, especially during
interactions with others.).
62. It is worth noting that limiting knowledge is not the only way to
practice voluntary restraint. You may also limit your use and distribution of
information. For example, suppose Schwartz knows that his student,
Edwards, is a single parent who is working and going to school. He uses this
information to make sure he encourages him to talk about the course in office
hours, but he does not use it to favor him in grading, and he does not
distribute the information to his colleagues without his consent.
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(used for anxiety disorders),63 but your internist may before he
or she prescribes it. Waiters and restaurant patrons, students
and teachers, pharmacists and customers, patients and doctors,
and myriad others observe informational boundaries
effortlessly, without thought or explicit negotiation. How does
that happen?
Our answer appeals to informational norms. Informational
norms
circumscribe the type or nature of information about various
individuals that, within a given context, is allowable, expected, or
even demanded to be revealed. In medical contexts, it is appropriate
to share details of our physical condition or, more specifically, the
patient shares information about his or her physical condition with
the physician but not vice versa; among friends we may pour over
romantic entanglements (our own and those of others); to the bank
or our creditors, we reveal financial information; with our professors,
we discuss our own grades; at work, it is appropriate to discuss
work-related goals and the details and quality of performance.64
Informational norms constrain the collection, use, and
distribution of information.65 The constraints vary as the
relevant social roles vary.66 Accordingly, we focus on
informational norms that take this general form: people shall
collect, use, and distribute information only in ways
appropriate to their social roles.67
Return to teachers and students. Why do they voluntarily
refrain from sharing certain information? Because it is an
informational norm that teachers and students voluntarily
refrain from sharing information in ways that ensure that
students are evaluated, in each course, primarily in the light of
their relevant academic achievements.
63. Alprazolam, MEDLINEPLUS, https://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus
/druginfo/meds/a684001.html (last updated Nov. 1, 2010).
64. Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, supra note 10, at 138.
Our emphasis on norms has its roots in Nissenbaums work. We differ from
Nissenbaum in the details of our conception of norms, in treating some
informational norms as coordination norms, and in emphasizing the role of
coordination norms in markets. See SLOAN & WARNER, UNAUTHORIZED
ACCESS, supra note 4, at 95120.
65. See, e.g., Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, supra note 10,
at 132-33 (discussing shifting concepts of what constitutes private
information).
66. See, e.g., id. at 13334 (discussing shifting concepts of privacy in the
context of the home, public spaces, and the internet).
67. See SLOAN & WARNER, UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS, supra note 4, at 98
101 (discussing norm-appropriate uses of information based on social roles).
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D. INFORMATIONAL NORMS AND COORDINATION
How do norms explain the coordination that creates
privacy in public? In the same way that a norm explains why
people in North America all drive on the right side of the
road.68 Safety and convenience dictate that you drive on the
same side as everyone else, and you need to cooperate with all
other drivers to do that.69 In the United States and other right
side countries, a norm enables and explains the coordination.
Such norms are appropriately called coordination norms.70
Driving on the right is in fact a classic example. The key
feature is that people drive on the right because, and only as
long as, almost everyone else does so.71 The point is to realize
the shared interest of all driving on the same side, so you would
not drive on the right if you expected everybody else to drive on
the left. The definition of a coordination norm is just a general
characterization of this sort of pattern. Thus: a coordination
norm is a behavioral regularity in a group, where the
regularity exists at least in part because (almost) everyone
thinks that, in order to realize a shared interest, she ought to
conform to the regularity, as long as everyone else does.72
Entering an elevator is another good example. The norm is to
maximize the distance to your nearest neighbor.73 All share an
68. See Richard F. Weingroff, On the Right Side of the Road, U.S. DEPT
OF TRANSP. (Oct. 17, 2013), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/right.cfm
(noting that the history of right-handed and left-handed travel is based on
customs).
69. Edna Ullman-Margalit, Coordination Norms and Social Choice, 11
ERKENNTNIS 143, 147 (1977).
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., H. Peyton Young, The Economics of Convention, 10 J. ECON.
PERSPECT. 105, 10708 (1996) (providing a game-theoretic explanation of the
decision made by individual drivers as to whether to drive on the right or left
side of the road).
72. See SLOAN & WARNER, UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS, supra note 4, at 56
59; see also ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 112
(2005) (As discussed in some detail in chapter 5, norms can be thought of as
shared concepts of what must, must not, or may be appropriate actions or
outcomes in particular types of situations.); Ullman-Margalit, supra note 69.
73. This is a simplification. The true norm is would be to maximize the
distance to your nearest neighbor but also stay within the peripheral vision of
at least one other passenger, and keep at least one other passenger within
your own peripheral vision. See JAMES S. SMITH, THE TREASURE HUNT:
DISCOVER AND RECLAIM YOUR LIFE 71 (2012) (discussing the norm of
establishing a maximum distance when other passengers enter the elevator);
Janine Driver, The Unwritten Rules of Elevator Etiquette, TODAY HEALTH
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interest in being able to use the elevator while not being
overcrowded. No one can realize the interest unilaterally, and
elevator users think they ought to conform to achieve this
balanceas long as everyone else does so. If everyone else just
stands anywhere they like, being a nearest-neighbor distance
maximizer does not prevent overcrowding.
Not all informational norms are coordination norms,74 but
the ones that concern us are. The coordination they facilitate
creates privacy in public through mutual voluntary restraint.
We conclude with two examples, both of which figure later in
our discussion of governmental surveillance.
The student/teacher norm is the first example.75 It fulfills
the conditions for a coordination norm. First, there is a shared
interest. Students and teachers share an interest in evaluating
students primarily for relevant academic work and in teachers
being evaluated primarily for teaching effectiveness. Second,
neither students nor teachers can realize that interest
unilaterally. Each group must voluntarily refrain from
revealing and learning too much. Third, the commitment to
such restraint is conditional. It takes a critical mass of
information-restricting students and teachers to ensure that
students and teachers are evaluated only on the basis of
appropriate information. There is no ensuring appropriate
academic evaluation point to being an information-restricting
student or teacher unless enough others are, so teachers and
students will typically honor the commitment only if enough
others do.
(Aug. 18, 2007, 10:54:05 AM), http://www.today.com/id/20335786/ns/today-
today_health/t/unwritten-rules-elevator-etiquette (same); Rebekah Rousi, An
Uplifting Experience  Adopting Ethnography to Study Elevator User
Experience, ETHNOGRAPHY MATTERS (Apr. 2, 2013),
http://ethnographymatters.net/blog/2013/04/02/an-uplifting-experience-
adopting-ethnography-to-study-elevator-user-experience/ (discussing how
behaviors surrounding spacing and eye-contact while riding elevators vary
between a building with a front security desk and a building without a front
security desk).
74. As previously discussed in Warner & Sloan, Self, Privacy, and Power,
supra note 7, at 82 n.68, Make your comments relevant is an informational
norm but not a coordination norm. The hallmark of a coordination norm is
that you adhere to it only as long as others do, but you would adhere to the
relevant comment norm even if most others did not.
75. For a similar discussion of the example of student/teacher
relationships in the context of coordinating norms around privacy, see id. at
71, 7879.
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Journalists and their sources are the second example. The
norm is that, exceptional circumstances aside, journalists
protect the political independence of the press by not revealing
their confidential sources.76 The argument that this norm is a
coordination norm parallels the student/teacher case. There is
a relevant shared interest. Journalists share an interest in
maintaining the secrecy of whistleblowing sources to ensure
that journalism plays an effective role as a political watchdog.77
No journalist can realize the interest unilaterally. No single
journalist can ensure a politically independent press. That
takes a concerted effort of a critical mass of journalists as well
as editors and media owners plus an appropriate political
system and culture. Finally, the commitment to non-disclosure
is conditional. That follows from the critical mass point. If not
enough journalists will refuse to disclose their confidential
sources, then there is no ensuring the independence of the
press justification for submitting yourself to the harassment of
76. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Reporter Jailed After Refusing to Name
Source, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at A1 (reporting on New York Times
reporter Judith Millers initial refusal to disclose a confidential source to a
grand jury, telling federal judge Thomas F. Hogan if journalists cannot be
trusted to guarantee confidentiality, then journalists cannot function and
there cannot be a free press).
77. See, e.g., Commissioner for Human Rights, Council of Europe, Ethical
Journalism and Human Rights (Nov. 8, 2011), https://wcd.coe.int/View
Doc.jsp?id=1863637#P252_37545 (When courts and public authorities ask
journalists to hand over material or information that may reveal a source of
information, most reporters will instinctively demur but occasions arise when
journalists come to a different ethical conclusion and their conscience compels
them to co-operate with the authorities, as some did by giving evidence at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague . . . .
Ethical reporting does not require a legal frameworkalthough journalists
who practise it do need the law to guarantee their rights to work freelybut
to build credibility and public confidence journalism must adhere to codes of
conduct and norms of ethical behaviour.); see also BOGHOSIAN, supra note 4,
at 183 (Most journalists feel an obligation to protect their confidential sources
even if threatened with jail time.); Leighton Walter Kille, JOURNALISTS
RESOURCE (Nov. 26, 2009), http://journalistsresource.org/tip-sheets/
foundations/principles-of-journalism (Journalism has an unusual capacity to
serve as watchdog over those whose power and position most affect citizens.
The Founders recognized this to be a rampart against despotism when they
ensured an independent press; courts have affirmed it; citizens rely on it.);
Stephen J.A. Ward, Why Hyping Transparency Distorts Journalism Ethics,
MEDIASHIFT (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2013/11/why-
hyping-transparency-distorts-journalism-ethics/.
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government surveillance,78 the risk of imprisonment for refusal
to disclose a source, 79 and, in national security cases, the
possible threat of prosecution under the Espionage Act.80
There are many similar examples.81 Our claim is that
governmental surveillance can, and does, undermine the norm-
based coordination on which privacy in public depends. One
good reason this matters is that adequate self-realization
requires adequate privacy in public.
II. PRIVACY IN PUBLIC AND THE SELF
We make three claims.82 First, the realization of a
multifaceted self is a personal and political ideal. Second, you
realize such a self in large part through social roles that
mediate interactions with others. Third, such realization
requires a significant degree of privacy in public. We argue for
each claim in turn.
A. THE IDEAL OF AMULTIFACETED SELF
We begin with William James. I am, James writes,
often confronted by the necessity of standing by one of my . . . selves
and relinquishing the rest. Not that I would not, if I could, be both
handsome and fat and well dressed, and a great athlete, and make a
million a year, be a wit, a bon-vivant, and a lady-killer, as well as a
philosopher; and a philanthropist, statesman, warrior, and African
explorer, as well as a tone poet and saint. But the thing is simply
impossible . . . . Such different characters may conceivably at the
outset of life be alike possible to a man. But to make any one of them
actual, the rest must more or less be suppressed. So the seeker of his
truest, strongest, deepest self must review the list carefully, and pick
out the one on which to stake his salvation.83
78. See, e.g., The Editorial Board, Spying on the Associated Press, N.Y.
TIMES, MAY 14, 2013, at A24.
79. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 76.
80. RAHUL SAGAR, SECRETS AND LEAKS: THE DILEMMA OF STATE SECRECY
105, 15455 (2013).
81. We have analyzed a number of other examples elsewhere. SLOAN &
WARNER, UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS, supra note 4.
82. As presented previously in Warner & Sloan, Self, Privacy, and Power,
supra note 7, at 6465 (presenting the multifaceted self in three similar claims
to discuss the relation between self, privacy, and the private sectors control of
our online activity).
83. 1 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 30910 (photo
reprint 1950) (1890).
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You make yourself who you are by what you stand by, by the
commitments you strive to realize.84 We take this to be a
widely shared conception of the selfwith one emendation.
James is wrong when he suggests that one central commitment
defines who you are; instead, as John Gray notes,
We are none of us defined by membership in a single community or
form of moral life. We are . . . heirs of many distinct, sometimes
conflicting, intellectual and moral traditions . . . . The complexity
and contradictions of our cultural inheritance give to our identities
an aspect of complexity and even of plurality which is . . . essential
to them . . . . [T]he power to conceive of ourselves in different ways,
to harbour dissonant projects and perspectives, to inform our
thoughts and lives with divergent categories and concepts, is
integral to our identity as reflective beings.85
The self you seek to realize is a multifaceted self. People differ
of course both in how much multiplicity they seek and in how
assiduously they try to realize that multiplicity, but, subject to
those differences, the realization of a multifaceted self is a
widespread personal ideal.86
84. Richard Warner, Adjudication and Legal Reasoning, in THE
BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 259, 269
(Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005). As previously noted
in Warner & Sloan, Self, Privacy, and Power, supra note 7, at 67 n.21, there is
more than one candidate for the label concept of the self. In particular, there
are pure ego or center theories. See C.D. BROAD, THE MIND AND ITS PLACE
IN NATURE 278, 55862, (photo. reprint 2009) (1925); COLIN MCGINN, THE
CHARACTER OF MIND: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 14062
(2d ed. 1997). For a commitment-based theory of the self, see RICHARD
WARNER, FREEDOM, ENJOYMENT, AND HAPPINESS: AN ESSAY ON MORAL
PSYCHOLOGY 9299 (1987).
85. JOHN GRAY, POST-LIBERALISM: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 262
63 (1993). It is not clear that James actually disagreed. As he notes elsewhere,
[p]roperly speaking, a man has as many social selves as there are
individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their
mind . . . Nothing is commoner than to hear people discriminate
between their different selves of this sort: As a man I pity you, but
as an official I must show you no mercy; as a politician I regard him
as an ally, but as a moralist I loathe him; etc., etc.
JAMES, supra note 83, at 29495.
86. Steven L. Blader, Lets Not Forget the Me in Team: Investigating
the Interface of Individual and Collective Identity, in IDENTITY AND THE
MODERN ORGANIZATION 61, 6465 (Caroline A. Bartel et al. eds., 2007) (noting
that in psychological research, [t]he research evidence supporting distinctions
among various levels of self construal is extensive and widespread with
variation among researchers looking at different emphasis and interactions
between levels from the individual self up to the collective self).
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This conception of the self also underlies liberal political
philosophy,87 the tradition in which we place ourselves. The
traditional political ideal is that the state should ensure, if not
actual self-realization, at least adequate opportunity to realize
a multifaceted self.
B. SOCIAL ROLES
Social roles mediate self-realization.88 You could not, for
example, be a journalist in a society that does not recognize
that role. Try to imagine the opposite. Imagine you live in a
society in which magazines, news media, and the like do not
exist. You are the lone deviant who does the things that
journalists do in other societies. You regularly investigate
events, collect and analyze material, and conduct interviews.
You do so with the primary intention of informing the public on
a variety of issues you find important. You are still not a
journalist in the sense that, for example, Bob Woodward is.89
To be a journalist in that sense is to fulfill a recognized role.
Contemporary society recognizes that behavior pattern as a
vocation, not as deviant and bizarre, and this means that
Woodward can refer to this role to explain his activities to
himself and other others. You cannot do that. You are just
deviant.
Similar examples abound. You cannot be a whistleblower,
an undercover agent, or university professor except in a society
with the appropriate institutions and practices. Even being a
parent, child, lover, or spouse takes on different meanings and
definitions depending on the society in which the relationship
is realized.90
87. For an excellent overview, see John Christman, Autonomy in Moral
and Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Aug. 11, 2009),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/autonomy-moral/.
88. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 30713, 34857 (1986)
(emphasizing the importance of social roleswhat he calls social formsto
the development of the self).
89. See generally Full Biography, BOB WOODWARD,
http://bobwoodward.com/full-biography (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
90. As we have previously discussed in Warner & Sloan, Self, Privacy,
and Power, supra note 7, at 69 & n.30, to avoid misunderstanding, we should
emphasize that we are not saying that ones possibilities or self-realization are
completely circumscribed by available social roles. Suppose that you live in a
yet to be discovered primitive tribe, isolated from the rest of the world. Women
are generally regarded as fungible property to be bought and sold. You are the
sole voice for gender equality. While the tribe recognizes other applications of
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C. THE NEED FOR PRIVACY IN PUBLIC
Realizing a multifaceted self means realizing multiple
social roles, and that requires privacy in public.91 Perhaps the
most obvious reason is that combining roles may violate others
expectations. Consider: parent and gay or lesbian;92 politician
and explorer of sexuality in sex clubs;93 exemplary elementary
school teacher and connoisseur of legal pornography; FBI agent
and whistleblower.94 The consequences of disappointing others
the concept of equality, gender equality seems ludicrous at best, unintelligible
at worst. Neither you, nor your society can understand your gender equality
claims with reference to a recognized social role, at least not the role of
advocate for gender equality. You, however, can still understand yourself as
committed to gender equality and that commitment can play a central role in
your self-definition. You are just extending your societys notion of equality
into a new area. Such examples do not, however, undermine our point that for
the most part the roles through which one realizes a multifaceted self are
social roles recognized in the society in which one lives.
91. For a similar discussion of privacy in public as it relates to norms and
expectations, see Warner & Sloan, Self, Privacy, and Power, supra note 7, at
6973.
92. Alana Semuels, Should Adoption Agencies Be Allowed to Discriminate
Against Gay Parents?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com
/politics/archive/2015/09/the-problem-with-religious-freedom-laws/406423/
([S]ome people dont think gay couples should be allowed to foster or adopt
children.).
93. See Sarah Hall, Jeri Ryan Sex-Club Scandal, E! ONLINE (June 22,
2004), http://www.eonline.com/news/47694/jeri-ryan-s-sex-club-scandal. As
discussed previously in Warner & Sloan, Self, Privacy, and Power, supra note
7, at 69 & n.32, Jack Ryans desire to explore sex with his famous actress wife
Jeri Ryan in a sex club may have been responsible for President Obamas
election to the US Senate in 2004. Ryan had won the Republican primary for
that Senate race and appeared to have a reasonable chance of defeating
Obama in the general electionuntil the news about the sex club broke. Ryan
was forced to withdraw from the race, and the Republican party of Illinois
selected the relative unknown Alan Keys to replace Ryan. Dan Collins, Sex
Scandal Ends Ryan Senate Bid, CBS NEWS (June 25, 2004),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/sex-scandal-ends-ryan-senate-bid/; Obama wins
Senate Race to Become 5th Black U.S. Senator in History, USA TODAY (Nov. 2,
2004), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/vote2004/2004-
11-02-il-ussenate_x.htm. Obama went on to win the general election in a
landslide.
94. Coleen Rowley was an FBI agent who disclosed a memo she wrote to
the Director of the FBI explaining how FBI headquarters in Washington had
hindered her investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui, an investigation that might
have prevented the 9/11 attacks. Time Magazine named her as a person of the
year for 2002, but facing what she described as a nasty backlash from the FBI,
she resigned from the FBI in 2004 after 24 years as an agent. See SAGAR,
supra note 80, at 148.
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expectations can range from disapproval, to reprisal, to
ostracism.
Avoiding disapproval and reprisal are not, however, the
only reasons to seek privacy in public. Imagine, for example,
that you eat frequently in a small Italian trattoria. You want to
play the role of customer they know very little about in order
to have an experience as disconnected as possible from the rest
of your life. You want a pleasant break from that life. Your
concern is not with their approval or disapproval; it is just with
what they know. You do not merely care that more knowledge
would change the way they relate to you. You do not want to
have even to think about whether it might do that. The
restaurant example illustrates two key points. First, social
roles are typically defined in part by the way you appear to
others when you are in them. Second, how you appear to others
depends on what those others know. The student/teacher and
journalist/confidential source examples illustrate the same two
points. The parties in those relationships cannot fulfill those
roles without the control over how they appear.
Control over how you appear to the government is an
important component of the control over appearance required
for successful self-realization. People play a wide variety of
roles in relation to the government, including: dissident,
political activist, member of the Sierra Club, academic critic of
the government, anonymous political critic, member of the
Democratic or Republican party, politically uninvolved, and so
on. How you appear to the government has a profound impact
on your prospects for self-realization. Some, for example, long
to take center stage in support of, or in opposition to, the
government; for others, that would be their worst nightmare.
In general, different requirements on what one is allowed,
expected, or required to reveal or not reveal define different
relationships with governmental authorities, acquaintances,
colleagues, friends, family, employers, and so on.95 The point is
a familiar one in sociology. As the sociologist Nippert-Eng
emphasizes:
At its core, managing privacy is about managing relationships
between the self and others . . . . [P]rivacy . . . [is] a boundary
regulatory process by which a person (or group) makes himself more
or less accessible and open to others. When we regulate our
accessibility to others, thoughincluding the accessibility of
95. Warner & Sloan, Self, Privacy, and Power, supra note 7, at 73.
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information, objects, space, time, or anything else that we deem
privatewe simultaneously regulate our relationships with them.96
Secrecy, she explains, is a means to an end, a process in
which we actively work to manage our private matters.97
Indeed,
No matter what the secret, no matter how it is manipulated or
what its fate, to consider a secret is to simultaneously consider the
relationships (perhaps entire social networks) that it throws into
relief. Indeed, from a sociological perspective, perhaps the most
significant aspect of secrets is their selectively shared nature. There
are secrets with and secrets from, intentionally disclosed to and
concealed from specific individuals at specific times and in specific
ways. Simultaneously inclusive and exclusive, secrets are quite
effective at achieving social boundary work, an excellent measure of
the social distance between individuals.98
Section IV argues that the governments current
surveillance practices can undermine the norm-based
coordination required for privacy in public and thus can
seriously curtail self-realization. Section III provides essential
background.
III. SURVEILLANCE CONCEPTS
Examinations of governmental surveillance typically
concentrate on the use of surveillance information to
discourage or prevent behavior that the government finds
undesirable.99 We consider five aspects of surveillance:
knowledge, use, merely knowing, complicity, and uncertainty.
In the next section, we show how these five features combine to
undermine privacy in public.
A. KNOWLEDGE
We will use know and knowledge in an artificially
broad sense. One of Snowdens remarks illustrates our use and
rationale: I, sitting at my desk, could wiretap anyone, from
you or your accountant, to a federal judge or even the
96. NIPPERT-ENG, supra note 10, at 22 (quoting IRWIN ALTMAN, THE
ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: PRIVACY, PERSONAL SPACE,
TERRITORY, CROWDING 3 (1975)). Charles Fried offers a similar conception in
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968).
97. NIPPERT-ENG, supra note 10, at 24 (footnotes omitted).
98. Id. at 27 (footnotes omitted).
99. See infra Section III, B.
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president, if I had a personal email.100 He was referring
evidently to the National Security Agencys (NSA) XKeyscore
program which allows analysts to search . . . through vast
databases containing emails, online chats and the browsing
histories of millions of individuals.101 Imagine XKeyscores
databases include the fact that you recently purchased Susan
Landaus Surveillance or Security?: The Risks Posed by New
Wiretapping Technologies.102 Does that mean Snowden knows
you bought the book? Of course not. He could find out from
XKeyscore that you did, but until he discovers that fact, he
does not know. We use know more broadly: the government
knows a fact when it possesses information that would reveal
that fact even if no person has examined the information and
thereby reached that conclusion.103 The point is convenience.
100. See Glenn Greenwald, How NSA Can See Nearly Everything You Do
Online: Secret Tool Searches Email, Chat and Social Media Use, GUARDIAN,
Aug. 1, 2013, at 1.
101. Id. For an accurate, well-documented summary of XKeyscore, see
XKeyscore, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title
=XKeyscore&oldid=620306883 (last visited Oct. 16, 2015). For a discussion
that sets XKeyscore in context, see INCENSER, or How NSA and GCHQ Are
Tapping Internet Cables, TOP LEVEL COMM. (Nov. 29, 2014),
http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/11/incenser-or-how-nsa-and-gchq-
are.html.
102. LANDAU, supra note 4.
103. One source of our concern to be clear about our sense of know is the
infamous exchange between Senator Ron Wyden and Director of National
Intelligence James Clapper. Wyden asked Clapper, Does the NSA collect any
type of data at all on millions or hundreds of millions of Americans? Dan
Amira, Is This a Video of the Director of National Intelligence Lying to
Congress? [Updated], N.Y. MAG.: DAILY INTELLIGENCER (June 6, 2013, 5:13
PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/06/wyden-clapper-nsa-video-
congress-spying.html. Clappers reply was, No, sir ... not wittingly. Id.
Clapper was accused of lying when Snowdens documents revealed the NSAs
practice of bulk surveillance, the NSAs collection of everything it can obtain
on every communications channel to which it can get access. This includes
things such as the NSAs bulk collection of call records, location data, e-mail
messages and text messages. Bruce Schneier, Its Time to Break Up the NSA,
SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Feb. 20, 2014), https://www.schneier.com/essays
/archives/2014/02/its_time_to_break_up.html. As Bruce Schneier noted,
[Clappers] definition of collect requires that a human look at it. So when the
NSA collectsusing the dictionary definition of the worddata on hundreds
of millions of Americans, its not really collecting it, because only computers
process it. Bruce Schneier, Why the NSAs Defense of Mass Data Collection
Makes No Sense, ATLANTIC (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics
/archive/2013/10/why-the-nsas-defense-of-mass-data-collection-makes-no-
sense/280715/. See ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER: BULK COLLECTION OF
TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT
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The governmental capacity to know is our concern, and it
makes for easier reading if we can just talk about what the
government knows without having to always insert the
qualification that we mean the capacity to know. One more
qualification: the government does not always know, sometimes
it merely believes and indeed may mistakenly believe.104 To
avoid having to always say know or believe, we will use
know to cover the belief cases as well.
Knowledge requires access to information. The government
ensures access in three ways: data collection,
aggregation/distribution, and the public/private surveillance
partnership. We discuss each in turn.
1. Data Collection
The window Snowden opened on the NSA has made it the
sinister poster child for those concerned about governmental
surveillance.105 His disclosurestotaling over 6,000 pages as of
Fall 2015106reveal the astonishingly wide reach of the NSAs
data collection.107 In the NSAs own words: Collect it All;
Process it All; Exploit it All; Partner it All; Sniff it All; Know it
All.108 A comparison with the Stasi highlights the extent of the
(2013) [http://perma.cc/8RJN-EDB7], for the Governments justification for its
data collection program.
104. E.g., Ana Garcia & Fred Mamoun, Mistakes on No Fly List Keeping
Travelers Grounded, NBC L.A. (Nov. 6, 2009, 2:23 PM),
http://www.nbclosangeles.com/on-air/as-seen-on/Mistakes-on-No-Fly-List-
Keeping-Travelers-Grounded-69337037.html ([P]roblems checking-in persist
for Garcia and many other Americans who have been erroneously placed on
the watch list.).
105. See, e.g., Dustin Volz, Edward Snowden Is Concerned About NSA
Fatigue, DEFENSE ONE (Aug. 14, 2015), http://www.
defenseone.com/technology/2014/08/edward-snowden-concerned-about-nsa-
fatigue/91496/.
106. Snowden Tally, CRYPTOME, http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-
tally.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
107. For the reach of the NSAs surveillance, see Jody Avirgan, A Running
List of What We Know the NSA Can Do. So Far., WNYC (Jan. 17, 2014),
http://www.wnyc.org/story/running-list-what-we-know-nsa-can-do-so-far/.
108. That was the NSAs description of its ambitions in a PowerPoint slide
at a secret meeting of the Five Eyes Alliance. Andrew Conry Murray, Collect It
All: The NSA Surveillance Doctrine, INFORMATIONWEEK (Aug. 1, 2014, 12:00
AM), http://www.informationweek.com/interop/collect-it-all-the-nsa-
surveillance-doctrine/a/d-id/1297748. The five eyes are Britain, the United
States, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. Paul Farrell, History of 5-Eyes 
Explainer, GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2013, 12:30 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/history-of-5-eyes-explainer.
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NSAs data collection.109 What is remarkable about the Stasi is
its penetration of the most ordinary, ostensibly nonthreatening,
areas of East Germany.110 As a former Stasi agent put it,
[t]here was nothing that we werent interested in.111 The
Stasi monitored 2,800 postal addresses; the agency steamed
90,000 letters a day.112 It also used a large informant network.
[I]n 1989, there were precisely 91,015 full-time Stasi
employees and 173,000 informants.113 This translates into
roughly 1 in 50 East Germans working for the Stasi.114 The
NSAs data collection regime exceeds the Stasis wildest
dreams.115 According to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
Judge Bates, the NSA acquires more than two hundred fifty
million Internet communications each year.116 The estimate
may be quite low. Greenwald reports that Snowdens
documents show that for a thirty-day period ending in
February 2013, one unit of the NSA collected more than three
billion pieces of communication data from US communication
systems alone.117
As astonishing as the NSAs data collection practices are,
they are consistent with past practices. The technologies are
new, but the practices are of a piece with governmental
surveillance in the United States from the Franklin Roosevelt
Administration on.118 Indeed, the twentieth century and the
109. See generally Elizabeth Murray, Examining the Stasi, Seeing the NSA,
CONSORTIUMNEWS (Feb. 3, 2015), https://consortiumnews.com/2015/02/
03/examining-the-stasi-seeing-the-nsa/.
110. BRUCE, supra note 1, at 11.
111. Id. at 55.
112. HARDING, supra note 2, at 254.
113. BRUCE, supra note 1, at 10.
114. Id. at 10 & 190 n.45.
115. See generally Ray Pensador, Worse Than the Stasi: How the Corporate
State is Turning Citizens into Spies, DAILY KOS (Dec. 17, 2013, 11:53 AM),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/17/1263418/-Worst-Than-The-Stasi-
How-The-Corporate-State-is-Turning-Citizens-Into-Spies.
116. Memorandum Opinion of Oct. 3, 2011, 2011 WL 10945618, at *9
(FISA Ct., Oct. 3, 2011) (emphasis added). Judge Bates notes that the Court
cannot know for certain the exact number of wholly domestic communications
acquired through this collection, nor can it know the number of non-target
communications acquired or the extent to which those communications are to
or from United States persons or persons in the United States. Id. at *10.
117. Greenwald, supra note 4, at 30.
118. Theoharis provides a detailed and well-documented account of the
growth of governmental surveillance from the 1933 Roosevelt Administration
to the present. See generally THEOHARIS, supra note 4.
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beginning of the twenty-first show a pattern of increasingly
pervasive and sophisticated surveillance by federal, state, and
local governments.119 Consider federal, state, and city video
and photo surveillance. Among cities, Chicago leads a large
pack. With 20,000 video cameras in downtown Chicago,
virtually every segment of the public way is under constant
video surveillance.120 The system also incorporates NeoFace,
one of the facial-recognition tools being used by police
departments across the country.121
Video surveillance is just one of a number of widely used
surveillance technologies. Others include, to name just a few,
remote fingerprint scanners,122 laser scanners that can
penetrate clothing and many other organic materials,123 and
palm and iris scanners.124 Our discussion of data collection
barely scratches the surface, but it should suffice to underscore
the fact that the government collects, and is deeply committed
to collecting, a massive amount of data.
119. As Theoharis notes, Roosevelts unprecedented authorization of
Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI) intelligence investigations, combined
with the similarly secret authorization . . . of other preventive detention and
informer programs, . . . shifted the focus of FBI investigations from law
enforcement to monitoring the political and personal activities of suspected
subversives. Id. at 24.
120. Adam Schwartz, Chicagos Video Surveillance Cameras: A Pervasive
and Poorly Regulated Threat to Our Privacy, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
47, 47 (2013). Operation Virtual Shield integrates the cameras into an
information processing and analysis system, which can, for example,
automatically search for the image of a particular car, and then automatically
track its movements, following the car out of the range of one camera and into
the range of the next. Id. at 4950; see also Frank Main, Chicago police go
high-tech with facial recognition software, CHI. SUN-TIMES (July 13, 2013,
10:08 AM) [http://web.archive.org/web/20141210013713
/http://www.suntimes.com/21268770-761/chicago-police-go-high-tech-with-
facial-recognition-software.html#.VhLIKMtVhBc].
121. Main, supra note 120; see BILGE YESIL, VIDEO SURVEILLANCE POWER
AND PRIVACY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 67, 2829 (2009); Intellistreets,
ILLUMINATING CONCEPTS, http://www.illuminatingconcepts.com/intellistreets/
(last visited Sept. 13, 2015); Chicago Police Start Using Facial-Recognition
Software to Arrest Suspects, RT (Jul. 15, 2013, 9:29 PM), http://rt.com/usa/
chicago-police-cctv-surveillance-135/.
122. See, e.g., IDAIR, http://www.idairco.com/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
123. E.g., Hidden Government Scanners Will Instantly Know Everything
About You From 164 Feet Away, GIZMODO (Jul. 10, 2012, 9:40 AM),
http://gizmodo.com/5923980/the-secret-government-laser-that-instantly-
knows-everything-about-you.
124. See, e.g., IRIS ID, http://www.irisid.com/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2015);
BLINKSPOT, http://www.blinkspot.com/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
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2. Aggregation and Distribution
Data aggregation and distribution take what separate
entities know and combine and distribute it so that many more
know it.125 Palantir is a good example. Palantir, funded in its
startup phase by the venture capital arm of the CIA,126 is a
private business that sells a suite of software applications for
integrating, visualizing and analyzing the worlds information.
[It] support[s] many kinds of data including structured,
unstructured, relational, temporal and geospatial.127 The
software allows you to access and make sense of data scattered
across any number of different databases.128 It can tie together
surveillance video . . . with credit-card transactions, cell-phone
call records, e-mails, airplane travel records, and Web search
information.129 Palantir has built a customer list that
includes the U.S. Defense Dept., CIA, FBI, Army, Marines, Air
Force, the police departments of New York and Los Angeles,
and a growing number of financial institutions trying to detect
bank fraud.130
Here is how it works. Mike Fikri gets a speeding ticket on
his way to Orlando, Florida.131 The ticket sets off an alert in the
CIAs Palantir system, prompting an analyst to search for
data.132 A graphical user interface displays the results: finger
print and DNA evidence collected in Cairo; an ATM video from
125. Data Aggregation, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/Data_aggregation (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
126. Andy Greenberg & Ryan Mac, How A Deviant Philosopher Built
Palantir, A CIA-Funded Data-Mining Juggernaut, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2013,
9:10 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/08/14/agent-of-
intelligence-how-a-deviant-philosopher-built-palantir-a-cia-funded-data-
mining-juggernaut/.
127. Palantir Technologies, IN-Q-TEL, https://www.iqt.org/iqt_portfolio
/palantir-technologies/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
128. Palantir Gotham, PALANTIR TECHNOLOGIES, https://www.palantir.com
/palantir-gotham/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
129. Ashlee Vance & Brad Stone, Palantir, the War on Terrors Secret
Weapon, BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com
/printer/articles/5771-palantir-the-war-on-terrors-secret-weapon.
130. Id.; see also Greenberg & Mac, supra note 126 (Palantir lives the
realities of its customers: the NSA, the FBI and the CIAan early investor
through its In-Q-Tel venture fundalong with an alphabet soup of other U.S.
counterterrorism and military agencies.).
131. Fikri is a fictional character Palantir uses when it shows prospective
customers how its products work. This paragraph summarizes the information
in Vance & Stone, supra note 129.
132. Id.
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Miami; photos of his rental truck license plate from a tollbooth;
phone records showing calls to Syria; and a map of his national
and international movements.133 Mouse clicks reveal more:
Fikri has been wiring money to the people in Syria he has been
calling; the Syrians, under investigation already, have been
meeting daily for two weeks and have purchased plane tickets
with Fikris money; and a map traces the money flow from
Cairo to Fikri in Miami, and from Fikri to the Syrians.134 In
light of the information, the Miami police arrest Fikri.135
Massive databases hold the information that Palantir
analyzes. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), for
example, maintains fusion centers formed after 9/11 to
aggregate and analyze massive amounts of data.136 Information
flows into government aggregation centers from government
and private entities.137 It is in fact a two-way street. Banks,
universities, hotels, defense companies like Boeing, and even
Starbucks can be interpreted as critical infrastructure, so
fusion centers can share information with them and in some
instances even allow private-sector representatives to be a part
of investigations.138
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. National Network of Fusion Centers Fact Sheet, U.S. DEPT HOMELAND
SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/safeguard-and-secure-cyberspace (last updated
Aug. 21, 2015). DHS maintains these centers in part because DHS has the
lead for the federal government for securing civilian government computer
systems, and works with industry and state, local, tribal and territorial
governments to secure critical infrastructure and information systems.
Safeguard and Secure Cyberspace, U.S. DEPT HOMELAND SECURITY,
http://www.dhs.gov/safeguard-and-secure-cyberspace (last visited Oct. 16,
2015). The data is necessary to make the most of the fast-growing volume of
digital data . . . . [b]y improving our ability to extract knowledge and insights
from large and complex collections of digital data, the initiative promises to
help solve some the Nations most pressing challenges. Press Release, Off.
Sci. & Tech. Poly, Obama Administration Unveils Big Data Initiative:
Announces $200 Million in New R&D Investments (Mar. 29, 2012),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/big_data_press_r
elease.pdf. The Obama administration continues this commitment despite
recent overtures on reevaluating the relationship between privacy and data
collection. See Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence, THE
WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 17, 2014, 11:15 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2014/01/17/remarks-president-review-signals-intelligence.
137. GILLIOM &MONAHAN, supra note 4, at 123.
138. Id.
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Fusion centers are not the only government aggregation
and distribution initiatives. The FBIs Next Generation
Identification139 and Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (IAFIS) integrate biometric information
across multiple databases providing a national fingerprint and
criminal history system that responds to requests 24 hours a
day, 365 days a year . . . [and] provides automated fingerprint
search capabilities, latent search capability, electronic image
storage, and electronic exchange of fingerprints and
responses.140 IAFIS includes [n]ot only fingerprints, but
corresponding criminal histories; mug shots; scars and tattoo
photos; physical characteristics like height, weight, and hair
and eye color; and aliases from federal and state law
enforcement agencies and criminal justice partners.141 The
system focuses on criminals, but it does include information on
civilians, mostly of individuals who have served or are serving
in the U.S. military or have been or are employed by the federal
government.142
3. The Public/Private Surveillance Partnership
The governments data collection and
aggregation/distribution efforts are impressive, but they pale in
comparison with the private sector. As Ronald Diebert notes,
in a very real sense we no longer move about our lives as self-
contained beings, but as nodes of information production in a dense
network of digital relations involving other nodes of information
production. All of the data about us as individuals in social network
communities is owned, operated, managed, and manipulated by
third parties beyond our control, and those third parties are,
typically, private companies. In assessing the full spectrum of major
social changes related to the information revolution, the entrusting
of this unimaginably huge mass of civilian data in private sector
hands ranks as perhaps the most important.143
Governmental access to this unimaginably huge mass of
civilian data vastly increases the reach of what the
139. Next Generation Identification (NGI), FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/ngi (last visited Oct.
16, 2015).
140. Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FED. BUREAU
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics
/iafis/iafis (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. DEIBERT, supra note 4, at 63.
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government knows about its citizens. This is what drives
Schneiers welcome to a world worries: Welcome to a world
where all of this, and everything else that you do or is done on
a computer, is saved, correlated, studied, passed around from
company to company without your knowledge or consent; and
where the government accesses it at will without a warrant.144
It is an exaggeration to claim the government accesses it at
will without a warrant.145 The governments access to the
information is extensive nonetheless.
The government routinely purchases information from
data aggregators such as Lexis/Nexis, Acxiom, Experian, and
Datalogix.146 In addition, it obtains information from voluntary
government/private sector sharing programs,147 statutes
authorizing, or in some cases mandating, information transfers
with only a subpoena or less.148 In general, information flows
144. The Internet Is a Surveillance State, supra note 6.
145. See infra notes 147150 and accompanying text (noting the voluntary
nature of government-private sector sharing programs).
146. Sandra Fulton, Senate Report Opens a Window Into Hidden World of
Data Aggregators, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Dec. 18, 2013, 3:51 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/senate-report-opens-window-
hidden-world-data-aggregators; see also JAY STANLEY, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, THE SURVEILLANCE-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: HOW THE AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT IS CONSCRIPTING BUSINESSES AND INDIVIDUALS IN THE
CONSTRUCTION OF A SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 25 (2004).
147. The Department of Homeland Securitys Enhanced Cybersecurity
Services is an example:
(ECS) is a voluntary information sharing program that assists U.S.-
based public and private entities [critical infrastructure owners and
operators] as they improve the protection of their systems from
unauthorized access, exploitation, or data exfiltration. DHS works
with cybersecurity organizations from across the federal
government to gain access to a broad range of sensitive and
classified cyber threat information . . . .
The ECS program does not involve government monitoring of
private networks or communications . . . . However, when a CSP
customer voluntarily agrees, the CSP may share limited and
anonymized information with ECS.
Enhanced Cybersecurity Services, U.S. DEPT HOMELAND SECURITY,
http://www.dhs.gov/enhanced-cybersecurity-services (last visited Oct. 16,
2015).
148. See Reidenberg, supra note 4, at 58990 (citing Erin Murphy, The
Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information Disclosure, the
Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 485, 51618 (2012) ([A] plethora of statutory provisions permit law
enforcement access to privately held data, . . . the typical mechanism is a
judicial subpoena rather than a warrant, and . . . subpoenas while easy to
obtain may be conditioned on prior notice or higher evidentiary standards.));
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readily between government and business, a situation Schneier
aptly labeled the public-private surveillance partnership.149
As he notes, [g]overnments are happy to use the data
corporations collect . . . . And corporations are happy to buy
data from governments.150
B. USE
The government uses the information it has to discourage
and prevent behavior of which it disapproves. Current critiques
of governmental surveillance tend to focus on this fact. Their
examples include journalists,151 political dissenters,152 lawyers
representing political activists and dissenters,153 politicians
opposing the policies and goals of those with the power to order
surveillance,154 sustainable energy advocates,155
environmentalists,156 animal rights activists,157 Afro-
Americans,158 Muslims,159 labor unions,160 people seeking
health care,161 welfare recipients,162 parolees,163 and a diverse
collection of types of people the government regards as
(possibly) undesirable.164 Critiques of surveillance typically
see also Slobogin, supra note 6; Stephen W. Smith, Gagged, Sealed &
Delivered: Reforming ECPAs Secret Docket, 6 HARV. L. POLY REV. 313 (2012);
Glenn Greenwald & James Ball, Revealed: The Secret Rules that Allows NSA
to Use Data Without a Warrant, GUARDIAN, Jun. 21, 2013, at 30.
149. See Bruce Schneier, The Public-Private Surveillance Partnership,
SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (July 31, 2013), https://www.schneier.com/essay-
436.html.
150. The Internet Is a Surveillance State, supra note 6.
151. BOGHOSIAN, supra note 4, at 17386.
152. Id. at 10712, 24963.
153. Id. at 15572.
154. See generally THEOHARIS, supra note 4.
155. BOGHOSIAN, supra note 4, at 3550.
156. Id. at 57.
157. Id. at 14042.
158. Id. at 76.
159. Id. at 8486.
160. THEOHARIS, supra note 4, at 4567.
161. See generally AMY L. FAIRCHILD ET AL., SEARCHING EYES: PRIVACY,
THE STATE, AND DISEASE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 129 (2007).
162. CHRISTIAN PARENTI, THE SOFT CAGE: SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA
FROM SLAVERY TO THEWAR ON TERROR 16268 (2003).
163. Id. at 16975.
164. See, e.g., id. at 178 ([P]olice in Wilmington, Delaware, began
compiling a databasenot of gangbangers or their associatesbut of people
who authorities believed might break the law sometime in the future. Within
2016] THE SELF, THE STASI, THE NSA 381
claim that some or all of these uses are illegitimate in the sense
that the governments goal is to discourage or prevent activities
typically considered permissible in a democratic state.165 The
claim is not without merit, but its validity does not matter
here. Our point is about all governmental use of surveillance-
based informationlegitimate and illegitimate alike. All of it
can have a chilling effect that undermines the norm-enabled
coordination necessary for privacy in public. We offer two
examples, both of which we also discuss in the next section.
Greenwald and Snowden are the first example. Snowden
first contacted Glen Greenwald by email using the pseudonym
Cincinnatus.166 Snowdens concern about governmental
surveillance led him to insist on PGP encryption.167 As
Greenwald explains, [t]he email began: The security of
peoples communications is very important to me, and its
stated purpose was to urge me to begin using PGP encryption
so that Cincinnatus could communicate things in which, he
said, he was certain I would be interested.168 Greenwald did
not bother to respond.
I frequently hear from all sorts of people offering me a huge story,
and it usually turns out to be nothing. And at any given moment I
am usually working on more stories than I can handle. So I need
something concrete to make me drop what Im doing in order to
pursue a new lead.169
Snowdens concern about government surveillance prevented
effective communication.
two months special jump out squads had begun files on over 200 people,
almost all of whom were Black or Latino. Just to be perfectly clear: the
subjects of the new database were not arrested for crimes or even considered
suspects. Instead they were simply peopleusually poor Black peoplewhom
the cops had stopped, frisked, interrogated, photographed, and then opened a
file because the subject had been found in so-called hot spots known for
violence and drug dealing.).
165. See supra note 4.
166. GREENWALD, supra note 4 at 7 ([It was] a reference to Lucius
Quinctius Cincinnatus, the Roman farmer who, in the fifth century BC, was
appointed dictator of Rome to defend the city against attack. He is most
remembered for what he did after vanquishing Romes enemies: he
immediately and voluntarily gave up political power and returned to farming
life. Hailed as a model of civic virtue, Cincinnatus has become a symbol of the
use of political power in the public interest and the worth of limiting or even
relinquishing individual power for the greater good.).
167. Id. at 8.
168. Id. at 7.
169. Id. at 9.
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This may seem like an inapposite example for us to use.
Our focus is on privacy in public, but Snowdens concern was
about email eavesdropping.170 Both norms and laws treat email
content much like the content of sealed letters, a paradigm of
privacy by enclosure.171 To see the connection to privacy in
public, consider how Greenwald and Snowden would have
communicated if surveillance had not been a concern. Snowden
would face the possibility that Greenwald would disclose his
identity to the government, but that would not stop him from
disclosing enough information to convince Greenwald that
there was indeed a huge story. He knew Greenwalds
reputation as a politically active journalist, so he would have
been certain that Greenwald would adhere to the journalist
protect your source norm. Thus, privacy-in-public-creating
coordination would have occurred. It initially did not because of
Snowdens concern about surveillance. As Greenwald puts it,
[we] found ourselves in a Catch-22. He was unwilling to tell me
anything specific about what he had, or even who he was and where
he worked, unless I installed encryption. But without the enticement
of specifics, it was not a priority to respond to his request and take
the time to install the program.172
He adds, Thats how close I came to blowing off one of the
largest and most consequential national security leaks in US
history.173
The second example is the generalization from the
Greenwald/Snowden case to any journalist and whistleblower.
Imagine they wish to disclose the perceived governmental
wrongdoing in mainstream media. Doing so ensures
widespread readership and a patina of legitimacy and
truthfulness. Securing publication can be problematic,
however. The problem is that writers and editors for major
publications and broadcast networks [engage in] a process of
consultation with government, and of voluntary self-restraint,
that is continual and intense.174 As Greenwald notes, there are
170. Id. at 8.
171. On norms, see supra Section I, A. For a judicial treatment of email as
similar to a sealed letter, see U.S. v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284 (6th Cir.
2010).
172. GREENWALD, supra note 4 at 10.
173. Id.
174. Allan M. Siegal, Secrets About Secrets: The Backstage Conversations
Between Press and Government 3 (Joan Shorenstein Ctr. on the Press, Pol., &
Pub. Poly, Working Paper No. 2007-2, 2007).
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unwritten protective rules that govern how the establishment media
report on official secrets. According to these rules, which allow the
government to control disclosures and minimize, even neuter, their
impact, editors first go to officials and advise them what they intend
to publish. National security officials then tell the editors all the
ways in which national security will supposedly be damaged by the
disclosures. A protracted negotiation takes place over what will and
will not be published. At best, substantial delay results. Often,
patently newsworthy information is suppressed.175
The New York Times reporters James Risen and Eric Lichtblau
are a good example. In mid-2004, they were ready to publish a
story exposing the NSAs warrantless eavesdropping, but the
Bush Administration pressured the Times into delaying
publication for fifteen monthsuntil Bush was reelected.176
And, then, the Times only ran the story because Risen was
about to scoop the paper by publishing the story in his Pulitzer
Prize winning book, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA
and the Bush Administration.177 Since the 2006 publication, he
has
been pursued by both the Bush and Obama administrations in a six-
year leak investigation into that book, State of War: The Secret
History of the CIA and the Bush Administration. Risen now faces
years in prison if he refuses to testify at the trial of a former CIA
officer, Jeffrey Sterling, who is accused of giving him classified
information about the agencys role in disrupting Irans nuclear
program.178
As New Yorker reporter Jane Mayer observed, [i]ts a huge
impediment to reporting, and so chilling isnt quite strong
enough, its more like freezing the whole process into a
standstill.179 Indeed, faced with threats of subpoenas from the
Department of Justice, Lichtblau stopped writing about
175. GREENWALD, supra note 4 at 55; see also Siegal, supra note 174
passim; Margaret Sullivan, Editorial, Lessons in a Surveillance Drama Redux,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2013, at SR12.
176. Byron Calame, Eavesdropping and the Election: An Answer on the
Question of Timing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2006, at C10.
177. JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA AND
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2006); Gabriel Sherman, Why Times Ran Wiretap
Story, Defying Bush, N.Y. OBSERVER, Dec. 26, 2005, at 1.
178. James Risen Prepared to Pay Any Price to Report on War on Terror
Amid Crackdown on Whistleblowers, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Oct. 14, 2014),
http://www.democracynow.org/2014/10/14/james_risen_prepared_to_pay_any.
179. Molly Redden, Is the Chilling Effect Real?, NEW REPUBLIC (May 15,
2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113219/doj-seizure-ap-records-
raises-question-chilling-effect-real.
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national security at the end of the Bush Administration.180
Risen continued (and continues) to write about national
security,181 and, while he was ultimately not called to testify at
the Sterling trial,182 he still describes the time as the most
stressful and traumatic time of my life.183
C. MERELY KNOWING
As worrisome as the journalist examples may be, most
people are not journalistsor political dissenters, lawyers
representing dissenters, or engaged in any activity that is
likely to expose them to a serious risk of governmental
reprisals based on surveillance information. Compare use with
merely knowing. The government knows a great deal about
everyone. Can the mere fact that government merely knows
have a chilling effect independent of the concern that the
government will use that information to your detriment? If so,
the chilling effect of merely knowing has far greater potential
reach than the chilling effect of use.
The answer to whether merely knowing can have a chilling
effect is, Yes, without question. What the government knows
about you determines how you appear to the government, and
controlling how you appear to the government is critical to
adequate self-realization, as we noted earlier.184
A clear example is First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles
v. NSA.185 Twenty-four organizations, represented by the
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), filed the case alleging
that bulk data collection under PATRIOT Act Section 215
180. Id. (Lichtblau said that subpoena threats from the DOJ were the
trigger that caused him to quit writing national security stories in the closing
days of the Bush administration.).
181. JAMES RISEN, PAY ANY PRICE: GREED, POWER, AND ENDLESS WAR
(2014).
182. Matt Apuzzo, C.I.A. Officer Guilty in Leak Tied to Reporter, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2015, at A1.
183. Sullivan, supra note 175.
184. See supra Section II, C.
185. Complaint, First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. National
Security Agency, No. 13-cv-03287 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2013); Aaron Mackey,
Update on First Unitarian Church v. NSA: EFFs First Amendment Challenge
to NSA Spying, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 18, 2015),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/09/update-eff-case-arguing-nsa-spying-
violated-groups-first-amendment-rights.
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violated their First Amendment right of association.186 The
EFF explains that
The collection and analysis of telephone records give the
government a broad window into our associations. The First
Amendment protects against this because, as the Supreme Court
has recognized, it may induce members to withdraw from the
association and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of
exposure of their beliefs shown through their associations and of the
consequences of their exposure.187
As the twenty-four declarations the plaintiffs filed show, fear
of exposure of their beliefs has a chilling effect that is
complementary to but independent of fear . . . of the
consequences of their exposure.188 For example, Mathew
Wood, Policy Director of Free Press,189 claims that
our members who wish to speak about the Associational Tracking
Program [EFFs label for bulk data collection under Patriot Act
Section 215] . . . have conveyed to me . . . their reservations and
increased concern about discussing such topics in the knowledge
that the . . . government is tracking their communicationsand in
the belief that speaking out against these programs could,
perversely, result in additional scrutiny and monitoring of such
members communications with our organization, government
officials, and our members friends and family members.
The Associational Tracking Program activities have thus
harmed Free Press because we have experienced a decrease in
telephone communications from members and constituents who had
desired the fact of their communication to our organization and to
their elected representatives either to remain secret or to remain
free from such tracking and monitoring.190
The source of the chilling effect is the governments
knowledgeits merely knowing, not its possible use of its
knowledge to the detriment of the members of the association.
Many are willing to take on the role of association member or
186. Mackey, supra note 185.
187. First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. NSA, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/cases/first-unitarian-church-los-angeles-v-nsa
(last visited Oct. 16, 2015) (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 46263
(1958)).
188. See id.
189. FREE PRESS, http://www.freepress.net/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
190. Declaration of Matthew F. Wood for Free Press in Support of
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, First United Unitarian
Church v. NSA, Case No. 313-cv-03287 JSW ¶¶ 4-5 (N.D. Cal. 2013),
https://www.eff.org/document/all-plaintiffs-declarations [hereinafter
Declaration of Matthew F. Wood].
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supporter in confidence, but not in a way that puts them on the
government radar as a member or supporter.
This makes good sense in light of our earlier discussion of
self-realization. Governmental surveillance turns the two-party
organization/individual relationship into a three-party
organization/individual/government relationship. As in the
Italian trattoria example, remaining in the role of member or
supporter unknown to the government may be quite important
to peoples choices about how they wish to live their lives. You
may be willing to enter the two-party relationship but not
willing to enter the three-party one, with the additional
complications and concerns it entails. Being on the
governments radar as a member of the Free Press may not be
consistent with other choices you have made about how to
pursue your self-realization. Note in this regard one key
difference with the Italian trattoria. You can walk away from
the restaurant, but you cannot walk away from the
government.
Similar concerns about roles and control over appearance
arise in other areas as well. Journalists and their confidential
sources is an example. The Obama Administrations
unprecedented threats and prosecutions of journalists and their
sources have heightened concern, not just about the
governments use of information, but also about what it merely
knows. For example, in With Liberty to Monitor All: How
Large-Scale US Surveillance Is Harming Journalism, Law, and
American Democracy, the ACLU reports that
Journalists expressed concern that, rather than being treated as
essential checks on government and partners in ensuring a healthy
democratic debate, they now feel they may be viewed as suspect for
doing their jobs. One prominent journalist summed up what many
seemed to be feeling as follows: I dont want the government to force
me to act like a spy. Im not a spy; Im a journalist.191
The complaint is not about possible governmental reprisals. It
is about being forced to change how you live your life as a
journalist. It is a complaint about changed self-realization. This
is not to say that journalist do not worry about reprisals. They
191. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WITH LIBERTY
TO MONITOR ALL: HOW LARGE-SCALE US SURVEILLANCE IS HARMING
JOURNALISM, LAW AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 4 (2014),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/dem14-withlibertytomonitorall-
07282014.pdf.
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do, as the earlier Risen/Lichtblau example shows, but those
concerns combine with concerns about self-realization.
Considerably more empirical work is called for to document
the chilling effect of the governments merely knowing. Our
contribution is theoretical. It consists in the model we develop
in the next section of when and how governmental merely
knowing undermines privacy in public. Two concepts play a key
role in that model: complicity and uncertainty.
D. COMPLICITY
The dictionary definition of complicity is involvement in
wrongdoing.192 We use complicity in a narrower sense. You are
complicit in surveillance when you knowingly convey
information to a third party in ways that violate relevant role-
appropriate norms. The first example is mainstream medias
adherence to the unwritten protective rules that govern how
the establishment media report on official secrets.193 Those
rules can lead media companies to divulge information to the
government in ways that are inconsistent with the journalist
norm to conceal the identity of confidential sourceseither
because the journalist outright discloses the source
(presumably under legal compulsion), or because the
government obtains enough information to infer the sources
identity.
Will the norm violation have a chilling effect? Yes, for two
reasons. The first is the same as in the merely knowing
discussion above. Complicity turns the two-party
journalist/source relationship into a multi-party
journalist/source/media/government relationship. A source
willing to enter the two-party relationship may not be willing
to enter the multi-party one. Entering that relationship can put
them on the governments radar in ways that may not be
consistent with choices they have made about how to pursue
their self-realization.194 The sources concern need not be just
about the use of information in reprisal. The source may also be
192. Complicity, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com
/browse/complicity (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
193. GREENWALD, supra note 4, at 55 (according to those rules, editors
first go to officials and advise them what they intend to publish, and then
[n]ational security officials . . . tell editors all the ways in which national
security will supposedly be damaged by disclosures).
194. See Declaration of Matthew F. Wood, supra note 190, at ¶¶ 45.
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concerned about the governments merely knowing. He or she
may not want to publicly play the role of a whistleblower even
in the absence of governmental reprisals. That could entail a
profound, and very much unwanted, change in the sources life.
The second reason complicity will have a chilling effect is
that complicity is a betrayal. A person expected to adhere to an
informational coordination norm violates that expectation.
That not only destroys the present attempt to coordinate, it
chills future attempts to the extent that people stop expecting
others to conform to the norm. Compare committed adherents
to an informational coordination norm. They might well
continue to coordinate under the norm even in the face of
governmental surveillanceeither by evasive strategies, or by
simply daring to continue under the governments eyes.
Complicity eliminates these possibilities by turning a former
compatriot into a government informant.
Educational surveillance is another good example. It is
common.195 Colleges, universities, and schools from K through
12 use surveillance software to monitor students and
teachers.196 Educational surveillance turns a two-party
student/teacher relationship into a multi-party relationship
among the student, the teacher, the school, and the
government.197 The software makes teachers complicit in
surveillance. They transfer information to the school in ways
195. For an excellent review, see Alan Rubel & Kyle Jones, Student Privacy
in Learning Analytics: An Information Ethics Perspective, 31 INFO. SOCY
(forthcoming 2015). See also Best School Administration Software, CAPTERRA,
http://www.capterra.com/school-administration-software/#infographic (last
visited Oct. 16, 2015).
196. [N]early seven out of ten institutions [of higher education] (69%)
currently view analytics as a major priority, and the importance of analytics in
higher education is growing exponentially. EDUCAUSE CTR. FOR ANALYSIS &
RESEARCH, ECAR STUDY OF UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS AND INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY, 2013, at 35 (2013), https://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/
ERS1302/ERS1302.pdf; see also CTR. FOR DIGITAL EDUC., BIG DATA AND
ANALYTICS IN K-12 EDUCATION: THE TIME IS RIGHT (2013),
http://www.hmhco.com/~/media/sites/home/teachers/files/hmh-cde_issue%20
brief_dataanalytics.pdf.
197. The government has relatively ready access to information obtained
through educational surveillance. See Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act (FERPA), U.S. DEPT OF EDUC. (2014), http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/
fpco/ferpa/index.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2015) (although the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act limits government access to educational
information for schools that receive government funds, significant exceptions
permit government access).
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that result in multiple violations of the student/teacher
informational norm under which students and teachers limit
their information exchanges so that, in each course, students
will be evaluated primarily in light of their academic
achievements in that course.198
Jenzabar is one widely used platform.199 It claims to be
the only LMS [learning management system] solution that
integrates completely with your administrative system, giving
you seamless data exchangeand up-to-the-minute
information.200 Adding Concourse from Intellidemia makes it
easy to extract data from each syllabus and aggregate them
into a single report . . . to determine if courses are meeting
program and institutional outcomes.201 Jenzabar Retention
software
aggregates each students information from disparate academic and
administrative systems across your campus to create comprehensive
student profiles. The result is a 360 degree view of each student
from academic performance and extracurricular engagement to
financial aid and demographic informationproviding you with deep
insights into potential risk factors and probabilities of success.202
Providing information to construct the 360 degree view
violates the student/teacher norm.203
The violation has a chilling effect. Studies of school
surveillance suggest surveillance creates hyper-vigilance and
distrust that limit the information sharing that would
otherwise occur under the student-teacher norm.204 One
198. For our discussion of this norm, see supra notes 6162, 75 and
accompanying text, and Warner & Sloan, Self, Privacy, and Power, supra note
7, at 65, 71, 7879.
199. User Experience Portal & Mobile, JENZABAR, http://www.jenzabar.com
/higher-ed-solutions/user-experience (last visited Oct 16, 2015).
200. Learning Management System (LMS), JENZABAR,
http://www.jenzabar.com/higher-ed-solutions/learning-management-system-
lms (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
201. Concourse: Features, INTELLIDEMIA,
http://www.intellidemia.com/products/features/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
202. Jenzabar Retention: Student Successes Through to Completion,
JENZABAR (2013), http://www.jenzabar.com/sites/default/files/resource-
downloads/Jenzabar_Retention_Brochure_web_2.pdf (emphasis added).
203. Warner & Sloan, Self, Privacy, and Power, supra note 7, at 65
([S]tudents and teachers . . . typically exchange only the information
necessary to their interaction in those roles and voluntarily refrain from
requesting, disclosing, or otherwise discovering more.).
204. EMMELINE TAYLOR, SURVEILLANCE SCHOOLS: SECURITY, DISCIPLINE
AND CONTROL IN CONTEMPORARY EDUCATION 6667 (2013); Andrew Hope,
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explanation certainly is that students limit their disclosures
because of concerns about use. They may fear the consequences
of being categorized as, for example, uncooperative, troubled,
antisocial, and so on. There are howeverand this is the point
we emphasizetwo complementary explanations. The first is
concern about merely knowing. Educational surveillance can
make students appear to both the school and government in
ways inconsistent with choices students have made about how
to pursue their self-realization.205 The second is betrayal. The
informational norm requires that teachers not disclose certain
information, and in blatant violation of the norm, they disclose
it.
We conclude with the same two points we made when
discussing merely knowing above. More empirical work is
called for, and our contribution is a theoretical framework that
may help guide such research. In developing that framework,
we focus particularly on complicity.
Seductions of Risk, Social Control, and Resistance to School Surveillance, in
SCHOOLS UNDER SURVEILLANCE: CULTURES OF CONTROL IN PUBLIC
EDUCATION 230, 23337 (Torin Monahan & Rodolfo D. Torres eds., 2010); see,
e.g., PARENTI, supra note 162; Craig Haney, The Psychological Impact of
Incarceration: Implications for Post-Prison Adjustment 711 (U.S. Dept of
Health and Human Servs. & The Urban Inst., Working Paper, 2001),
http://img2.timg.co.il/CommunaFiles/19852476.pdf; Stephen Parker & Rodney
Fopp, Mutual Obligation? Regulating by Supervision and Surveillance in
Australian Income Support Policy, 3 SURVEILLANCE SOCY 107, 11520 (2005),
http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/Articles3(1)/mutual.pdf. There are
studies of the use of closed circuit television (CCTV), biometric identification,
radio frequency identification devices (RFID), and full time police presence.
The studies are consistent with the results of studies on the psychological
impact of surveillance in other contexts. See, e.g., PARENTI, supra note 162;
Haney, supra; Parker & Fopp, supra.
205. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board makes the same
point about the bulk collection of telephone records:
[T]he bulk collection of telephone records can be expected to have a
chilling effect on the free exercise of speech and association, because
individuals and groups . . . who for various reasons justifiably do
not wish the government to know about their communications 
must either forgo such activities, reduce their frequency, or take
costly measures to hide them from government surveillance.
PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE
RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT
ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
COURT 12 (2014), http://www.pclob.gov/Library/215-Report_on_the
_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf.
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E. UNCERTAINTY
Uncertainty plays a key role in undermining privacy in
public. We explain what we mean by uncertainty here, and
turn to its undermining role in the next section. To introduce
the idea, note that governmental access to massive amounts of
data raises two questions. The knowledge question: What is
the probability that the government knows X about me? The
use question: Given that the government knows X, what is the
probability that it will use that knowledge to my detriment?
So far, we have tacitly assumed that individuals can answer
both questions by specifying a probability. This is not to say
that people can answer with a precise number, like seventy
percent. Everyday thought about probabilities typically
proceeds in terms of a range from extremely likely to extremely
unlikely. People specify a probability when they demarcate a
region in that range in a way that is sufficiently clear and
definite for practical purposes. We will call cases in which
people are able to specify a probability specific probability
cases. Sometimes people cannot specify a probability in
response to a knowledge or use question. The answer to the
request for a specific probability in such cases is, I have no
idea what the specific probability is. We will describe these
cases as instances of uncertainty.206
Uncertainty can arise with regard to both the knowledge
and use questions. We focus on the former but, for
completeness, begin with uncertainty about use. The subpoena
threat Lichtblau faced is an example.207 Imagine him asking,
Given what the government knows about me, how likely is the
government to issue a subpoena? It can be quite difficult to
answer with a specific probability. [R]eporters can lawfully be
compelled to reveal the identities of those who have disclosed
classified information to them, but the Justice Departments
internal guidelines caution prosecutors against compelling the
disclosure of the identity of a reporters sources.208 In general,
206. This technical use of uncertainty is standard in economics. See KEN
BINMORE, RATIONAL DECISIONS 35 (2009) (providing the examples of playing
roulette in a casino as an event where probabilities can be assigned, and
betting on horses in a race as an event with uncertainty where it comparably
does not make sense to attribute a probability to such a one-off occurrence);
OSTROM, supra note 72, at 49.
207. See Redden, supra note 179.
208. SAGAR, supra note 80, at 106.
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the governments willingness to use information to discourage
or prevent behavior depends on government policy and the
immense variety of factors that affect its implementation.209
Uncertainty about what the government knows has two
primary sources: information asymmetry, and the mosaic
effect.
Information asymmetry. As the information technology
expert Alessandro Acquisti notes, [a]dvancements in
information technology have made the collection and usage of
personal data often invisible. As a result, individuals rarely
have clear knowledge of what information other people, firms,
and governments have about them or how that information is
used and with what consequences.210 A good illustration
(which happens to involve complicity) is a whistleblower whose
goal is to disclose perceived governmental wrongdoing in
mainstream media while maintaining secrecy about his or her
identity. The media companys contact with the government
may or may not lead to demands that it reveal the identity of
the source, and the media company may or may not comply.211
As we noted earlier, journalists can lawfully be compelled to
reveal the identities of those who have disclosed classified
information to them, but the Justice Departments internal
guidelines caution prosecutors against compelling the
disclosure of the identity of a reporters sources.212 Earlier,
this point supported a point about use: the claim that a
journalist may not be able to specify the probability with which
the government will compel them to reveal their source. This
time it supports a point about knowing: a whistleblower may
not be able to specify the probability that the government will
learn his or her identity.
The mosaic effect. Combining information into large
collections can reveal things that no significantly smaller
subset does.213 That effect is the mosaic effect. Thus, even if,
209. See generally id. at 17, 3049 (discussing use of secrecy to protect the
national interest by presidents from the nineteenth century to present day).
210. Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte & George Loewenstein,
Privacy and Human Behavior in the Age of Information, 347 SCIENCE 509, 509
(2015).
211. See Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom
of Speech, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 261, 27374 (1998).
212. SAGAR, supra note 80, at 106.
213. B. Rose Huber, Mosaic Effect Paints Vivid Pictures of Tech Users
Lives, Felten Tells Privacy Board, WOODROW WILSON SCH. PUB. & INTL AFF.
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implausibly, you know everything the government knows about
you, you may not know what they will infer from the
aggregation of what they know. To take a simple example
involving a very small amount of data, suppose that you travel
frequently to Eastern Europe to teach legal education
programs. Combining information about your ticket purchases
with your online bio easily leads to that conclusion. But what is
the specific probability that the government has drawn that
conclusion? Or, some less desirable conclusion? The answer can
easily be, I have no idea.
IV. HOW SURVEILLANCE UNDERMINES COORDINATION
Surveillance threatens norm-enabled coordination through
concern about the use of information and through concern
about loss of control over appearance. We use a well-known
part of game theory, the Assurance Game, to show when and
why.
A. THE ASSURANCE GAME
The Assurance Game gets its name from the way in which
its outcome depends on what each player thinks the other will
do.214 Suppose, for example, that Victor and Victoria are
(Nov. 20, 2014), http://wws.princeton.edu/news-and-events/news/item/mosaic-
effect-paints-vivid-pictures-tech-users-lives-felten-tells-privacy; see also David
E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of
Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628 (2005) (chronicling the dramatic increase
in the Bush Administrations use of mosaic theory to deny information
requests after 9/11, and the evolving jurisprudence on the meaning and
foundation of mosaic arguments); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power:
Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV.
1393 (2001) (highlighting the compounding loss of privacy that results from
combining databases of information).
214. The game goes by a variety of names besides Assurance Game. Others
are Trust Dilemma, Coordination Game, and Stag Hunt. WILLIAM
POUNDSTONE, PRISONERS DILEMMA 219 (1992). Stag Hunt is perhaps the
most used name. It harks back to Rousseaus description of the stag hunt
dilemma (the translation uses deer instead of stag): Was a deer to be
taken? Every one saw that to succeed he must faithfully stand to his post; but
suppose a hare to have slipped by within reach of any one of them, it is not to
be doubted but he pursued it without scruple. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A
DISCOURSE UPON THE ORIGIN AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE INEQUALITY
AMONG MANKIND 32 (Cosimo 2008) (1755). We use Assurance Game to
emphasize the role of knowledgeor lack of itin determining what the
players do. For a discussion of the importance of the Assurance Game to
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discussing by cell phone whether to meet at the opera later in
the evening or whether each will stay home alone. Before they
decide, their phone batteries run out, and they have no other
way to communicate. They both have, and know they both
have, the following preferences in the following order. (1)
Attend the opera together. (2) Stay home alone when the other
does too. (3) Stay home alone when the other goes to the opera.
Neither wants to pass up meeting at the opera. (4) Go to the
opera when the other does not.
The Assurance Game consists of two players with similar
preferences.215 But exactly what preferences? They do not
always involve operas and homes. To generalize, think of going
to the opera as cooperating in the attempt to meet at the opera,
and staying home as defecting from the coordination needed to
meet at the opera. For appropriate specifications of cooperation
and defection, an Assurance Game consists of two parties with
these preferences: (1) cooperate when the other cooperates; (2)
defect when the other defects; (3) defect when the other
cooperates; (4) cooperate when the other defects.
What will Victor and Victoria do? Focus on Victoria
(essentially the same remarks hold for Victor). What she will do
depends in part on how much she values her options relative to
each other. We will describe the relative values using a scale of
10 to -10. This is the beginning of a small bit of mathematical
precision that is a useful and harmless idealization. It is useful
because the idealization allows us to derive results easily and
clearly. It is harmless because the results remain valid for the
un-idealized reality. Suppose, then, that Victoria rates meeting
analyzing social coordination, see BRIAN SKYRMS, THE STAG HUNT AND THE
EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE 114 (2004).
215. In addition, the parties are unable to communicate, and each chooses
without observing or otherwise learning about the choice of the other. These
assumptions, and the joint knowledge of one anothers preferences, are classic
assumptions of game theory. See generally, e.g., KEVIN LEYTON-BROWN &
YOAV SHOHAM, ESSENTIALS OF GAME THEORY: A CONCISE,
MULTIDISCIPLINARY INTRODUCTION (2008); MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL
RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY (1994). The game theory literature
is not completely consistent on terminology. Some definitions allow for
variations such as both players being indifferent between outcomes (2) and (3),
and some make distinctions between Stag Hunt and Assurance Game
based on this sort of difference. The crucial point is that both outcomes where
the two players do the same thing form Nash equilibria, with one having a
higher payoff than the other. See, e.g., SAMUEL BOWLES, MICROECONOMICS:
BEHAVIOR, INSTITUTIONS, AND EVOLUTION 43 (2003).
2016] THE SELF, THE STASI, THE NSA 395
Victor at the opera at 5. On the other hand, she regards that
going to the opera when Victor does not as a disaster, so she
rates that 10. Staying home alone when Victor also does is 3;
while staying home when Victor goes to the opera is 1. The 3
versus 1 difference represents the value Victoria places on
coordinating with Victor. Given these valuations, should
Victoria go to the opera or stay home?216 It is important to
distinguish between the specific probability and uncertainty
cases.
Specific probability cases. Assume Victoria answers the
question, How likely is it that Victor will go to the opera?
with 80%. Victorias answer means she can infer the
probability of Victor staying home alone. Since Victor will
either go to the opera or stay home, the probability of his
staying home is the same as the probability of his not going to
the opera: 100%  80% = 20%. With these probabilities, she
calculates the expected value of her going to the opera and of
her staying home alone: respectively, 2.0 and 1.4.217 So, insofar
as she is rational, Victoria will go to the opera. Indeed, Victoria
arrives at a more general conclusion: to go to the opera only if
she believes the probability of Victor going is 76% or greater.
She arrives at that conclusion by asking, When do going to the
opera and staying home have the same expected value? The
answer is, when the probability of Victor going to the opera is
216. If Victor and Victoria played out this scenario on a regular basis, then
in game theory terminology we would have a repeated game rather than a
one-shot game. For repeated games, game theory predicts that the players will
settle into one of the two Nash Equilibria, either both going to the opera or
both staying home, and stay in that equilibria. See, e.g., EVELYN C. FINK,
SCOTT GATES & BRIAN D. HUMES, GAME THEORY TOPICS: INCOMPLETE
INFORMATION, REPEATED GAMES, AND N-PLAYER GAMES 3247 (1998). For our
one-shot case, the players dilemma is whether to go to the opera, intuitively
aiming for the payoff-dominant best possible outcome of going to the opera
together, or to stay home, avoiding the risk of going to the opera when the
other stays home. For the seminal technical treatment of this issue see John
C. Harsanyi, A New Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Complete
Information, 8 GAMES ECON. BEHAV. 91, 91122 (1995). In the main body of
this article we try to illuminate some of the general ideas.
217. Going to the opera has two outcomes: meeting Victor, and not meeting
Victor. Its expected value is the sum of the expected values of those two
options: (0.8 x 5) + (0.2 x -10) = 2.0. Staying home likewise has two options:
staying home when Victor does, and staying home when he does not, so the
expected value of staying home is (0.2 x 3) + (0.8 x 1) = 1.4.
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76%.218 Below 76% staying home has the better expected value,
so Victoria should only go to the opera if the probability of
Victor going is at least 76%.
In the un-idealized reality, Victoria does essentially the
same thing. She takes her rough estimates of probability and
combines it with a typically non-quantitative understanding of
how much she values the various options to make the best
compromise she can between how much she values the options
and the likelihood of realizing what she values by the actions
open to her.
Uncertainty cases. Suppose Victoria answers, What is the
specific probability that Victor will go to the opera? with I
have no idea. Imagine that she and Victor are new
acquaintances and have little knowledge of each others
personal characteristics. She knows that there is some chance
that Victor will go to the opera and some chance that he will
decide to do something else, but she does not know, nor does
she even have grounds for an educated guess about, what those
probabilities are. She assumes that the distribution of opera-
attending probabilities over people in Victors situation exhibits
more or less the bell-shaped curve of a standard distribution
with a peak somewhere in the broad vicinity of probability
50%.219
It may seem that Victorias uncertainty makes the
expected value calculations we used earlier irrelevant. Not
quite. She knows a crucial fact: she should only go to the opera
if the probability of Victor going is above 76%. This makes
going to the opera a risky choice. It does, that is, when
combined with her assumption of a standard distribution of
opera-attending probabilities over people in Victors situation.
Then, as far as Victoria knows, chances are the probability of
Victor attending the opera is below 76%, so she is likely to end
up at the opera alone if she goes. Her best choice is to stay
home.
218. For any probability p, the expected value of going to the opera is (p x
5) + ((1  p) x -10), and the expected value of staying home is ((1  p) x 3) + (p x
1), so Victoria solves this equation to find the value of p: (p x 5) + ((1  p) x -10)
= ((1  p) x 3) + (p x 1). The value of p is 13/17 ≈ 0.76.
219. To be more precise, we should say, 50% or lower. As the argument in
the next paragraph shows, the father away from higher probability cases
Victoria believes the peak of the curve to be, the stronger the argument that
she will not go to the opera.
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The Assurance Game model offers a way to explain when
and why government surveillance undermines norm-governed
coordination that creates privacy in public. We turn to that
explanation now. We begin with the specific probability cases
and then turn to uncertainty and complicity.
B. SPECIFIC PROBABILITIES
We discuss two examples. The first involves use and the
second merely knowing. Greenwald and Snowdens initial
attempts to communicate provide the first example. The first
point to note is that they were involved in an Assurance Game.
We describe the preferences using the cooperate and defect
terms. Cooperate means collaborating with each other to
expose the NSA. For Greenwald to cooperate is for him to seek
to secure publication in mainstream media. For Snowden, it
includes providing information sufficient to expose the NSA.
Defect means not cooperatingfor example, because the NSA
prevented it, or because, for Snowden, he did not really have
the requisite information, or because, for Greenwald, he could
not convince editors to publish the stories. Given this
understanding, their preferences were as follows: (1) Cooperate
when the other cooperates. This is what both clearly want
most.220 (2) Defect when the other defects. Neither wants to
waste time and take risks attempting to cooperate if the other
is not going to cooperate. (3) Defect when the other cooperates.
220. Greenwald had written for the past seven years . . . almost on a daily
basis about the dangerous trends in US state secrecy, radical executive power
theories, detention and surveillance abuses, militarism, and the assault on
civil liberties. GREENWALD, supra note 4, at 14. Snowden explained his
motivation this way:
I understand that I will be made to suffer for my actions, and
that the return of this information to the public marks my end. I
will be satisfied if the federation of secret law, unequal pardon, and
irresistible executive powers that rule the world that I love are
revealed for even an instant.
Id. at 32. Snowden knew and respected Greenwalds reputation as a crusader
who would take risks and resist the pressure to censor or suppress
publication. Id. at 53 (On several occasions, Snowden explained that he had
wanted Laura and me [Greenwald] to be involved in the stories from the start
because he knew we would report them aggressively and not be susceptible to
government threats. He frequently referred to the New York Times and other
major media outlets that had held up big stories at the governments request.
But while he wanted aggressive reporting, he also wanted meticulous
journalists to take as long as necessary to ensure that the facts of the story
were unassailable and that all of the articles had been thoroughly vetted.).
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Neither wants to pass up a chance to expose the NSA when it is
possible to do so. (4) Cooperate when the other defects.
Cooperating when the other defects means wasting time and
pointlessly running the risk of governmental reprisals.
If surveillance had not been a concern, they would have
easily both cooperated since Snowden would have revealed
enough to remove Greenwalds conviction that he was just
another person offering him a huge story that would turn out
to be nothing.221 Snowdens concern about surveillance
prevented that. He was certain that the government would
detect unencrypted communication and intervene to prevent
his exposing the NSA.222 Cooperating meant installing
encryption software, and Greenwald was unwilling.223 His
unwillingness is exactly what the Assurance Game model
predicts.
It does so predict, that is, given plausible assumptions
about how Greenwald valued the various options. There is need
to argue that the following values really are Greenwalds. A
fictional Greenwald makes as good an example as the real one.
We use a 10 to -10 scale again: (1) Mutual cooperation rates 10.
Exposing the NSA was extremely important to Greenwald. (2)
Greenwald did not want to waste time pursuing worthless
leads. So, we assign a rating of 3 to defecting when Snowden
defects. (3) Greenwald would hate to miss the opportunity to
expose the NSA. Thus, -5 is a reasonable rating for defecting
when Snowden cooperates. (4) Cooperating when Snowden
defects means wasting time and running pointless risks of
reprisals. So, rate it -10. These numbers exactly parallel
Victorias (we picked the numbers with this in mind), so it
follows that Greenwald will cooperate only if he thinks the
probability of Snowdens doing so is at least 76%; but, he did
not think the probability was anywhere in that range. He
thought it highly likely Snowden would defect by not really
having documents that would expose the NSA.
To illustrate the effect of governmental merely knowing,
consider any journalist and whistleblowing confidential source.
We give cooperate and defect somewhat more general
meanings. For the journalist, to cooperate is to seek publication
221. Id. at 9.
222. Id. at 910.
223. Id.
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while maintaining secrecy of the sources identity; and, to
defect is to fail to obtain publication or to fail to maintain
secrecy. For the source, to cooperate is to provide documents
that adequately document governmental wrongdoing; and, to
defect is not to do so. The journalist and the source share the
following Assurance Game preferences: (1) Cooperate when the
other cooperates. Both want most to expose governmental
wrongdoing. (2) Defect when the other defects. Neither wants
wasted effort. (3) Defect when the other collaborates. Neither
wants to pass up the opportunity to expose wrongdoing. (4)
Cooperate when the other defects. Neither wants to run the
risks of cooperation for no gain.
Governmental merely knowing can lead the source to
defect even when the journalist cooperates. Governmental
knowledge comes from covert surveillance and from unwritten
protective rules that govern how the establishment media
report on official secrets.224 Those rules ensure that a
protracted negotiation takes place over what will and will not
be published.225 Imagine a source who is willing to supply
evidence of wrongdoing only if his or her identity can remain
secret. The sources objection is not, or not only, that the
government will use the information to the sources detriment.
The objection is that the source does not want to appear to the
government and the public as a whistleblower. That is
inconsistent with the path of self-realization the source has
chosen and wishes to continue. The source would have this
objection even if disclosing the information had no other
adverse consequences.
The source has two ways to preserve the secrecy of his or
her identity. One way is to rely on the journalists coordination
(recall we defined cooperation to include maintaining secrecy);
the other is to defect and so avoid interactions that would put
the sources identity at risk of disclosure. When will the source
defect to preserve secrecy? That depends of course, on how the
source values the relevant options. Suppose, as is plausible,
that they parallel the Greenwald/Victoria values. Thus: (1)
Cooperate when the journalist cooperates: 10. (2) Defect when
the journalist defects: 3. (3) Defect when the journalist
cooperates: -5. (4) Cooperate when the journalist defects: -10. In
224. Id. at 55.
225. Id.
400 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 17:1
this case, the source will defect unless he or she believes the
probability that the journalist will cooperate (and thus
maintain secrecy) is fairly high (0.76). The Bush and Obama
administrations readiness to investigate and prosecute
journalists and their confidential sources may well have
convinced some sources that secrecy was much less likely than
that. As The New York Times journalist Philip Shenon
remarked, after the Bush Administration seized his phone
records, My goodness, if I were one of my sources, I would
never talk to me again, even about stories that really would
have been a public service.226
Journalist/source is just one of a vast number of
relationships in which people exchange information under the
protective shield of informational norms. Massive
governmental data collection means the government may know
a great deal about those relationships. When will people react
like the source in the example above and defect from
relationships by abandoning them or by continuing them while
withholding information that they would have readily conveyed
in the absence of governmental surveillance? They will if, like
the source, they see a sufficiently large downside in the
governments knowing certain information and think the
probability sufficiently high that the government knows it. Will
that happen? Uncertainty makes it more likely.
1. The Significance of Uncertainty
In the specific probability cases, people defect because they
assign a specific probability to the governments using or
knowing certain information. We focus on the knowledge cases.
Information asymmetry and the mosaic effect can make it
difficult for people to assign specific probabilities to whether
the government knows some fact about them.227 So, if the
assignment of a specific probability were required for defection,
massive governmental knowing would lead to defection only in
the relatively limited cases in which people did assign specific
probabilities.
In fact, uncertainty easily leads to defection. Suppose the
source in the previous example is uncertain about whether the
226. Redden, supra note 179; see also Charles Lane, N.Y. Times Must
Surrender Reporters Phone Data, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2006, at A16.
227. See Huber, supra note 213.
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government will learn his or her identity. Will the source
defect? Use the same valuation of alternatives as before. Then
the calculation is the same as in the Victor/Victoria opera
example: the source will defect unless he or she believes the
probability of the journalists cooperating is at least 76%. But
the source will believe the probability is below that and
defectassuming the source believes the distribution of
governmental-knowledge probabilities takes more or less the
bell-shaped curve of a standard distribution.
What does this mean for the ubiquitous surveillance of
everyday life? Does it mean that massive governmental
knowledge about everyone threatens massive defection? The
right response is to ask, defection from what? We have
defined cooperate and defection case by case for particular
Assurance Games. Is there some type of Assurance Game
everyone plays from which everyone might defect? There is.
People play Assurance Games with respect to informational
coordination norms that facilitate privacy in public. Pick any
such normthe student/teacher norm or the journalist/source
norm, for example. Cooperate means conforming to the norm.
Defect means not conforming. The parties interacting under
such norms have the following Assurance Game preferences:
(1) Cooperate when the other cooperates. This is most preferred
because the parties have internalized the norm and value the
privacy in public it creates and the self-realization it facilitates.
(2) Defect when the other party defects. The attempt to
cooperate is pointless when the other party does not cooperate.
(3) Defect when the other party cooperates. Defecting in this
case throws away an opportunity to realize the most preferred
option of mutual coordination. (4) Cooperate when the other
defects. Cooperation in this case wastes effort and pointlessly
assumes whatever risks are attendant on coordination when
the other defects.
At present, in a wide range of cases, people realize the
cooperate/cooperate alternative and, thereby, create norm-
based privacy in public. So surveillance, although pervasive,
has not greatly disrupted norm-based coordination. Is there
reason to think this will change? Complicity is one major
reason.
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2. The Significance of Complicity
Massive governmental knowing creates massive
complicity. Contemporary surveillance turns individuals and
institutions into informants on others. Individuals become
informants on others because the data trails they leave do not
reveal information just about them. They reveal the
relationships with others woven into the pattern of their lives.
Indeed, under our definition of complicity telephoning a friend
can make you complicit in surveillance provided you are aware
of the Snowden revelations about governmental data collection.
The journalist/source and educational surveillance examples
suggest widespread complicity will have a widespread
undermining effect on coordination under informational norms.
But it would be a mistake to conclude that this will happen
across the board. Complicity has an undermining effect in the
journalist/source and educational surveillance examples when
sources and students assign a large disvalue to governmental
merely knowing. The following analogy suggests that parties to
norms may not always assign such a large disvalue.
Suppose Bob confides in Alice that he finds Carol gorgeous
and cannot stop thinking about her, and Alice tells both Doug
and Carol. Bob does not object to his best friend Doug knowing,
but he assigns a large disvalue to Carol knowing. Her knowing
deprives him of control over an aspect of the way he appears to
her, and his control over his appearance in that regard is
particularly important to him. His concern is not that she will
use the information to harm him; he just did not want to
appear to her in the role of someone obsessed with her beauty.
So, are peoples disvaluing of governmental knowledge more
like Bobs reaction to Doug or to Carol? The answer is almost
certainly neither. It is reasonable to expect the effect on
coordination to spread across a spectrum from extreme
disvalue to minimal disvalue.
The future distribution of cases across this spectrum plays
a key role in the future of surveillance. The distribution
depends on the combined effect of use, merely knowing, and
especially complicity. Will the betrayal of trust involved in
complicity eventually lead people to assign a large disvalue to
government surveillance?
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V. THE FUTURE
As Niels Bohr and Yogi Berra both are reputed to have
observed, prediction is very difficult, especially about the
future.228 Accordingly, we outline three possible future
scenarios and offer them, not as predictions, but as reference
points to guide future choices.
A. THE STASI AS A REFERENCE POINT
The history of the Stasi makes current surveillance
practices stand out in sharp relief. Four features characterized
the Stasis surveillance practices.
First, massive knowing: As we noted earlier, the Stasi
engaged in massive data collection and hence knew a great deal
about East German citizens.229
Second, complicity: Informants spied on friends,
workmates, neighbors and family members. Husbands spied on
wives.230 Even if the people with whom you interacted were
not Stasi informants, the 1 in 50 distribution of informants231
made it likely that friends, acquaintances, and acquaintances
of your friends would be. Relations between people were
conditioned by the fact that one or other of you could be one of
them [the Stasi]. Everyone suspected everyone else, and the
mistrust this bred was the foundation of social existence.232
Third, pervasive repressive use: The Stasi translated its
massive merely knowing into pervasive repressive use:
At its heart, the Stasi was an organization that monitored socie-
ty for those who . . . thought differently. Stasi officers worked tire-
lessly to insure that a disruption to the socialist orderbe it anti-
state graffiti, the establishment of groups that did not conform to the
SEDs world-view, defections, or whatever form it might takedid
not occur.233
228. Yogi Berra Quotes, FAMOUS QUOTES & QUOTATIONS,
http://www.famous-quotes-and-quotations.com/yogi-berra-quotes.html (last
visited Oct. 16, 2015); Quote Details: Niels Bohr, QUOTATIONS PAGE,
http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/26159.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
229. See supra notes 110114 and accompanying text.
230. HARDING, supra note 2, at 254.
231. BRUCE, supra note 1, at 10 & 190 n.45.
232. ANNA FUNDER, STASILAND: STORIES FROM BEHIND THE BERLIN WALL
28 (2011).
233. BRUCE, supra note 1, at 140.
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As the novelist Anna Funder notes in her study of the Stasi, it
arrested, imprisoned and interrogated anyone it chose.234 She
adds that [m]any of the punishments were simply for lack of
belief, or even suspected lack of belief. Disloyalty was
calibrated in the minutest of signs: the antenna turned to
receive western television, the red flag not hung out on May
Day.235
Fourth, curtailed self-realization: Merely knowing,
complicity, and repressive use severely curtailed possibilities
for self-realization. As Gary Bruce puts it in his study of the
Stasi,
One does not detect from East Germans reflections on their past
that they were gripped by a paralyzing fear, in the psychological
sense of the wordalthough one interview subject did say she was
always afraidbut rather a deep resignation that one was not the
master of ones own destiny, that to run afoul of the Stasi, even
unintentionally, was to sacrifice power over ones life and the life
opportunities of family members.236
The United States certainly outdoes the Stasi in the
amount it knows and, perhaps, even in the extent of citizen
complicity.237 In this way, the United States has traveled down
the road that leads to the Stasi. But it is far from Stasi-like
surveillance. It differsonly, but criticallyin being far more
restrained in its use of information to discourage and prevent
behavior the government finds undesirable. This is less
reassuring than it may seem, however. There is a tendency of
234. FUNDER, supra note 232, at 59.
235. Id. at 157.
236. BRUCE, supra note 1, at 158 (footnotes omitted).
237. Everyone with any online presence is unknowingly complicit in the
transfer of information about others to private businesses and hence to the
government through the public/private surveillance partnership. In that
sense, complicity in surveillance greatly surpasses the Stasis 1 in 50
informant ratio. Knowing complicity may do so as well. Post-Snowden,
knowledge of government surveillance is widespread. According to a 2013
PEW survey, 50% of Americans answered a lot to: How much, if anything,
have you heard about the government collecting information about telephone
calls, e-mails and other online communications as part of efforts to monitor
terrorist activity? Another 37% answered a little. PEW Research Center for
the People & the Press July 2013 Political Survey, PEW RES. CTR. FOR PEOPLE
& THE PRESS (2013), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-questionnaires/7-
26-13 NSA Topline for Release.pdf. Totaling the percentages yields 87% with
some knowledge of government surveillance and hence, possibly, some
knowledge of their own complicity. The extent of actual knowledge of
complicity is unclear, and, as we argued in Section IV, D, the undermining
effect of knowing complicity is unclear at present.
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surveillance systems to spread. It simply lies in the interests of
both government and private surveillance operations to
expandto cover more people and more of the lives of the
people they cover.238
B. THREE POSSIBLEWORLDS
So what does the future hold?
1. A Stasi-Like World
Imagine the tendency of surveillance systems to spread
leads the government to greatly expand the range of behavior it
uses surveillance to prevent or discourage. Against that
background, fear of reprisals, concern about merely knowing,
uncertainty, and complicity combine to undermine norm-based
coordination. Adequate privacy in public disappears and rich
possibilities for self-realization vanish along with it.
Many may react with, It cant happen here. The
comments of a German philologist who witnessed the rise of
the Nazis are a reminder that it could.
What happened here was the gradual habituation of the people,
little by little, to being governed by surprise; to receiving decisions
deliberated in secret; to believing that the situation was so
complicated that the government had to act on information which
the people could not understand, or so dangerous that, even if people
could understand it, it could not be released because of national
security . . . .
This separation of government from the people, this widening of
the gap, took place so gradually and so insensibly, each step
disguised (perhaps not even intentionally) as a temporary emergency
measure or associated with true patriotic allegiance or with real
social purposes. And all the crises and reforms (real reforms, too) so
occupied the people that they did not see the slow motion
underneath, of the whole process of government growing remoter
and remoter . . . .
. . . .
. . . Each step was so small, so inconsequential, so well explained
or, on occasion, regretted, that, unless one were detached from the
whole process from the beginning, unless one understood what the
whole thing was in principle, what all these little measures that no
patriotic German could resent must some day lead to, one no more
saw it developing from day to day than a farmer in his field sees the
corn growing . . . .
. . . .
238. RULE, supra note 8, at 151.
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. . . Believe me, this is true. Each act, each occasion, is worse
than the last, but only a little worse. You wait for the next and the
next. You wait for one great shocking occasion, thinking that others,
when such a shock comes, will join with you in resisting somehow.
. . . .
. . . Suddenly it all comes down, all at once. You see what you
are, what you have done, or, more accurately, what you havent done
(for that was all that was required of most of us: that we do
nothing) . . . . You remember everything now, and your heart breaks.
Too late. You are compromised beyond repair.239
This iswe hopean unlikely path. We think the second
scenario more likely.
2. The Pose No Challenge Bargain
Governmental use of information to control behavior
expands but stops far short of Stasi-like levels. People become
accustomed to massive governmental merely knowing. They
also become used to increasing individual and organizational
complicity and do not assign a large disvalue to the transfer of
information about norm-governed transactions to the
government. Accepting massive complicity means accepting the
government as an observer in norm-governed transactions. The
effect is what numerous studies confirm: people increase their
conformity to the standards they attribute to the watchers. Life
becomes as Solzhenitsyn describes it in Cancer Ward:
As every man goes through life he fills in a number of forms for the
record, each containing a number of questions . . . . There are thus
hundreds of little threads radiating from every man, millions of
threads in all. If these threads were suddenly to become visible, the
whole sky would look like a spiders web, and if they materialized as
rubber bands, buses, trams and even people would all lose the ability
to move, and the wind would be unable to carry torn-up newspapers
or autumn leaves along the streets of the city. They are not visible,
they are not material, but every man is constantly aware of their
existence . . . .
Each man, permanently aware of his own invisible threads,
naturally develops a respect for the people who manipulate the
threads.240
The ultimate result is a world in which an
implicit [unacceptable] bargain . . . is offered to citizens: pose no
challenge and you have nothing to worry about. Mind your own
239. MILTON MAYER, THEY THOUGHT THEY WERE FREE: THE GERMANS,
193345, at 16672 (2d ed. 1966).
240. ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN, CANCER WARD 20809 (Nicholas Bethell
& David Burg trans., Vintage 2003) (1968).
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business, and support or at least tolerate what we do, and youll be
fine. Put differently, you must refrain from provoking the authority
that wields surveillance powers if you wish to be deemed free of
wrongdoing. This is a deal that invites passivity, obedience, and
conformity. The safest course, the way to ensure being left alone, is
to remain quiet, unthreatening, and compliant.241
It would be better if self-realization is not curtailed in ways
that invite passivity, obedience, and conformity, but retains a
wide range of options available. The third scenario aims at that
outcome.
3. Adequate Privacy in Public
It would greatly reduce the surveillance threat to self-
realization if there were appropriate informational norms
constraining governmental collection, distribution, and use of
information. The necessary norms would implement an
acceptable tradeoff between the need for privacy in public and
the benefits of governmental surveillance in ways that
facilitated the creation of privacy in public through
coordination in informational-norm based interactions.
Such norms do not exist. We lack norms that allow
governmental surveillance while constraining it in ways that
ensure adequate privacy in public. One response is to
substitute explicit legal regulation for norms. Norms, however,
have at least three relevant advantages over laws. First,
knowledge: parties to norms know what they are. You know the
norm-implemented privacy tradeoffs without having to read a
privacy policy, or master a statute or series of judicial
decisions. Second, fine-grained, flexible constraints: norms
constrain a wide variety of different types of information
processing over a wide range of situations while allowing
adjustments for different individual or contextual needs. It is
difficult for explicit legal regulation to be similarly
comprehensive, detailed, and flexible. Third, the recognition of
privacy in public: informational norms facilitate the creation of
privacy in public. No matter what the means, it is essential to
constrain the governmental use of surveillance information in
ways that enable the coordination necessary to create an
adequate degree of privacy in public. Adequacy is a matter of
allowing multifaceted selves to flourish; otherwise, weour
selvesbecome shadows of what we once were.
241. GREENWALD, supra note 4, at 195.
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We conclude with Glen Greenwalds 2014 version of
Schneiers 2007 question with which we began:
[W]e stand at a historic crossroads. Will the digital age usher in the
individual liberation and political freedoms that the Internet is
uniquely capable of unleashing? Or will it bring about a system of
omnipresent monitoring and control, beyond the dreams of even the
greatest tyrants of the past? Right now, either path is possible. Our
actions will determine where we end up.242
242. Id. at 6.
